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LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RELATIONS:  REVISITING TWENTY-ONE YEARS 
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 




 In 1994, over 150 nations converged in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, and completed what was, at that time, the most 
ambitious multilateral intellectual property (IP) agreement ever 
negotiated.  Built on the cornerstone of the “Great Conventions,”1 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement)2 profoundly altered the nature, scope, and economic 
consequences of international intellectual property regulation. 3  
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1  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Berne Convention].  
2  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1197  [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
3  See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L L. 345 (1995) 
[hereinafter Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards] (discussing global economic 
consequences of the TRIPS Agreement); see also Keith E. Maskus, Lessons from 
Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
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The presumptive goal of the Uruguay Round negotiations, and its 
specific manifestation in the TRIPS Agreement, was to secure 
export markets for a wide variety of knowledge goods in which 
industrialized countries had long held a competitive advantage.  In 
more fundamental terms, the TRIPS Agreement sought to reshape 
the conditions of future global competition, particularly the extent 
to which developing countries could use intellectual property as a 
form of industrial policy in pursuit of strategic development 
objectives.  With strong upgrades in patent and copyright 
protection, seminal international coverage of new subject matter, 
and a celebrated enforcement mechanism,4 the TRIPS Agreement 
targeted the soft underbelly of the development process.5  In so 
doing, however, it made access to knowledge and technology 
acquisition by firms in developing countries more costly,6 thereby 
undermining their ability to compete in a global knowledge 
economy, at least in the short run.  More insidiously, the TRIPS 
Agreement heralded a potent blend of global and local politics,7 
thus defining a new era of private sector influence in the political 
economy of globalized intellectual property norms.8  The policy 
                                                     
2219, 2228-30 (2000) (predicting global impact of rent transfers as a result of 
international patent regulation under the TRIPS Agreement). 
4  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 1(2), 64.  
5  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 
AM. ECON. REV., 460, 483 (2002) (“One of the most important determinants of the 
pace of growth is the acquisition of knowledge”); INT’L BANK OF RECONSTR. & DEV., 
WORLD BANK GROUP, LIFELONG LEARNING IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: 
CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (2003) (“A knowledge-based economy 
relies primarily on the use of ideas rather than physical abilities and on the 
application of technology rather than the transformation of raw materials or the 
exploitation of cheap labor.”).  See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges 
for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 473 (2001) 
(providing a table of estimated economic impact of TRIPS patent changes for 
selected countries). 
6  U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., The TRIPS 
Agreement and Developing Countries 36, UNCTAD/ITE/1 (1996) (providing 
estimates of costs of TRIPS implementation in some developing countries); INT’L 
BANK FOR RECONSTR. & DEV., WORLD BANK, Global Economic Prospects and the 
Developing Countries 136 (2002), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2002/Resources/gep2002complete.
pdf  (citing J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, World Bank, Implementation of 
Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge (1999) (manuscript)). 
7  See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the 
TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 845–48 (2003) (discussing 
cooperation of US, Japan and EU firms in getting their governments to pursue the 
TRIPS Agreement). 
8  See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE 
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implications of the new rules established by the TRIPS Agreement 
arose first in the context of its patent provisions.  In particular, 
South Africa played the lead role in a public health crisis that 
unfolded dramatically on the global stage.9  The moral, ethical and 
legally controversial arguments about the extent to which TRIPS 
obligations require an unraveling of the domestic social welfare 
calculus of a WTO member state galvanized an entire “access-to-
medicines” movement that ricocheted around the world.10  The 
controversy produced a formal amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, known colloquially as the “Doha Declaration,”11 that 
clarified the right of WTO member states to interpret the 
Agreement “in light of [its] object and purpose . . . .”12  It also 
specifically reaffirmed the right of member states to protect public 
                                                     
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). In addition to the 
traditional state actors, several other powerful forces are at play, including large 
multinational corporations, industry lobbyists, internet intermediaries, 
international organizations, and NGOs.  The biggest direct stake in TRIPS 
outcomes was held by a handful of industry actors, whose global monopolies 
depended on securing strong worldwide IP protection:  the pharmaceutical 
industry ($650 billion annual revenue, estimated to increase to $1.5 trillion), the 
entertainment and software industries ($800 billion), and the commercial seed 
industry ($21 billion). See generally CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (2009). With so much at stake, these industry 
players continue to exert significant pressure and influence domestically, 
producing new webs of multilateral IP agreements. 
9  See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Industry to Drop AIDS Drug Lawsuit Against South 
Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1999, at A3 (reporting on patent infringement 
controversy between U.S. pharmaceutical companies and South African 
government over the country’s loosening of patent laws to reduce medical costs 
for AIDS patients).  In 1997, South Africa passed a law that permitted exceptions 
to national patent laws (primarily compulsory licensing and parallel importing) to 
reduce the price of AIDS pharmaceuticals.  This resulted in an international 
controversy, with the United States threatening to impose unilateral trade 
sanctions.  However, strong adverse public reaction forced the Clinton 
administration to back down, and the dispute was quietly settled without the 
involvement of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.   
10  See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New 
Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 821–39 (2008) (describing the 
origins and development of the “Access to Knowledge” movement).   
11  Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, 




12  Id. ¶ 5(a). 
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health.13  
Today, the access to medicines movement and its corollary, the 
access to knowledge movement,14 are key players in the politics of 
international intellectual property relations.  The movements 
represent a globally linked and loosely organized opposition to the 
untested assumptions and overarching philosophy of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  Working within a framework animated by 
considerations of social justice, liberty ideals and good governance, 
this ad-hoc alliance of activists, scholars and organizations 
maintains close watch over the normative contours of the 
multilateral IP system and promotes strategies to resist 
deterministic outcomes of global IP norms.  In so doing, many of 
the alliance’s chief protagonists also challenge and seek to 
influence domestic political processes that are inordinately 
influenced by the economic claims of industries whose business 
income flow principally from an expansive trough of IP rights. 
Twenty-one years later, the IP world for which the Uruguay 
Round laid its foundation is very different from what many 
imagined at the end of the negotiations in 1994.  The TRIPS 
Agreement has neither confirmed the worst fears of developing 
countries nor accomplished the greatest hopes of the developed 
ones.  Instead, both sides have inserted important points of 
adherence and resistance to the negotiated global IP norms, thus 
destabilizing many of the Agreement’s implicit political and 
economic bargains.  On the one hand, developed countries have 
moved aggressively to adopt ever more pervasive strategies to 
curtail unilateral exercises of IP policy in developing countries.  At 
the same time, new sites of resistance to the built-in normative 
flexibility recognized by the TRIPS Agreement have become 
entrenched in a viral web of bilateral, regional and plurilateral 
agreements. 15   For their part, some developing countries are 
demonstrating nascent institutional capabilities that have 
facilitated creative approaches to implementing TRIPS obligations, 
while advancing ideals of welfare unique to national 
circumstances.  To be clear, some of these developments are not 
specifically directed at TRIPS obligations.  Rather, as these 
countries institutionalize international obligations in areas such as 
human rights, the environment or public health, IP norms have 
                                                     
13  Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 5(c). 
14  Kapczynski, supra note 10. 
15  Maira Sutton, TPP: Internet Freedom Activists Protest Secret Trade Agreement 
Being Negotiated this Week, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 14, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/tpp-another-backroom-deal. 
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become the implicit, and in some cases explicit, subject of legal 
innovation in a broader scheme of national welfare planning.   
For my purposes in this Article, legal innovation does not 
consist simply of episodic responses to particular international 
pressures.  Rather, legal innovation is (i) characterized by the 
potential that the selected tools for innovation are sustainable 
within the local legal culture; (ii) fueled by a clearly identified 
national development purpose or strategy; and (iii) effectuated 
principally by local actors. I define legal innovation as the 
development of new techniques, institutions and/or methods that 
respond to TRIPS obligations and facilitate their implementation in 
a manner consistent with national welfare goals. This approach 
turns the TRIPS Agreement inwards by encompassing local needs, 
priorities, and politics in a deliberate reconciliation of multilateral 
obligations and domestic economic, cultural and political interests. 
As a result, legal innovation has forged new approaches to the role 
of IP in national economic policy, evidenced by unfolding 
developments in India, South Africa and Brazil.16  Legal innovation 
has also engendered new domestic regimes to attract foreign 
investment in Malta,17 has offered opportunities for constitutional 
considerations to re-direct the dominance of the classical economic 
narrative of IP in Kenya, 18  and, paradoxically, has added to 
existing IP standards, particularly in the realm of patentable 
subject matter, in ways that rebalance power equities between 
informal knowledge holders and patent applicants in China and 
India.19  Within the international IP policy space, these various 
forms of legal innovation may suggest that the minimum 
standards of the TRIPS Agreement that evoked such significant 
global consternation may yet offer a basis for countries to construct 
policy spaces in alignment with development goals.  These spaces 
may, in turn, allow domestic institutions to interrogate the values 
of the Agreement in light of broader considerations of domestic 
human welfare.  Framed in this manner, legal innovation 
constitutes a method for more finely honed approaches to defining 
sovereign responsibility for the effects of IP rights in society and for 
indirectly circumscribing the scope of Executive power in bilateral 
                                                     
16  See infra Part 3.1.2. 
17  See infra Part 3.1.3. 
18  See infra Part 2.1.3. (discussing the Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-General case, 
in which the Kenyan High Court overturned  a TRIPS-driven anti-counterfeiting 
statute to preserve access to affordable, life-saving generic drugs). 
19  See infra Part 2.1.3. 
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or multilateral norm-setting exercises.20  In Part 1, I describe how 
the TRIPS Agreement ultimately opened the policy spaces 
conducive to legal innovation.  I highlight the unfulfilled promise 
of the Agreement, offering a critique of the model of “hard” 
harmonization that it incorporates.  In Part 2, I briefly review the 
structure and main provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, focusing 
on the patent provisions that were the most challenging during the 
negotiations.  I include a short analysis of how those provisions 
and key aspects of the architecture of the Agreement have defined 
the outer limits of the scope for legal innovation efforts in 
developing countries.  In Part 3, I consider examples of legal and 
institutional innovation in emerging economies and link them to 
the resilience of development aspirations, which are key 
motivators for domestic actors’ creative responses to TRIPS 
obligations.  Finally, in Part 4, I discuss the implications of new 
multilateral initiatives that seek to build on the TRIPS baseline.   I 
explore modes of legal innovation in the ongoing IP reform efforts 
in Brazil and South Africa.  In addition, Part 4 reflects on the 
institutional capacity and processes of IP reform, which enable 
legal innovation to thrive.  Specifically, IP reform initiatives 
facilitate legal innovation first by making national IP policy a 
subject of public discourse and then by creating a process in which 
multiple stakeholders engage in dialogue with relevant IP agencies 
as well as each other.  Ultimately, I suggest that the instability 
generated by a new breed of plurilateral agreements has ushered 
multilateral IP norm-setting, and the TRIPS Agreement 
specifically, into an age of uncertainty.  This age, I propose, is a 
harbinger for leveraging legal innovation to re-institute more 
defensible norms in the fabric of multilateral IP treaties.  It is 
unclear how long the specific types of innovative oeuvres I discuss 
in this Article will last or to what extent developing countries can 
resist the inevitable backlash that will certainly continue to come 
from developed countries.  A sustained capacity to engage in forms 
of legal innovation that advance a distinctive domestic welfare 
                                                     
20  Courts in the U.S., for example, have issued a series of opinions that 
clearly are in tension with the maximalist narrative of the TRIPS Agreement.  See, 
e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(holding that a composition involving isolated DNA was not patent eligible); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (holding that a business method of 
hedging financial losses in energy industry not patent eligible); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (holding that 
a medical diagnostic method that added administering steps to a natural 
correlation was not patent eligible); see also infra note 106 and accompanying text 
(discussing the same cases).  
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vision, while credibly complying with the TRIPS Agreement, will 
define the extent to which developing countries can meaningfully 
limit the potential for adverse welfare consequences from 
heightened costs of access to knowledge and technological inputs.  
But, it is the comparative national institutional capacity and agility 
of the developed and developing countries alike that will 
ultimately define the efficacy of the TRIPS Agreement and its 
progeny in the years to come. 
 
1. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: 
BARGAINING TO THE BASELINE 
 
 Few participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations 
anticipated the complex political and legal aftershocks that 
resonated after the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement.  Part 1 will 
present how legal innovation in response to the TRIPS Agreement 
was largely facilitated by the structure of the Agreement.  Next, 
Part 1 explains how the underlying goals of the Agreement - 
harmonization and enforcement - opened policy spaces in which 
countries could conceive of the legal measures I later describe as 
legal innovation.  Lastly, I explain how the TRIPS Agreement’s 
minimum standards in the patent context recalibrated the global 
policy landscape in favor of industry and private actors, thereby 
placing developing countries in the strategic position of weighing 
compliance measures against their own domestic welfare calculus.  
 
1.1. TRIPS as the Source of Legal Innovation 
 
 Two important developments suggest the TRIPS Agreement 
may have accomplished a goal far more significant for 
development, and more telling for the future of IP harmonization, 
than any of the normative concerns occupying the scholarly debate 
for the past two decades.  
 First, the TRIPS Agreement greatly expanded the power of 
domestic IP agencies in all countries regardless of development or 
income levels. 21   A new professional class of IP technocrats 
                                                     
21  See, e.g., National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrate
gy.pdf (“By 2020, China will become a country with a comparatively high level in 
terms of the creation, utilization, protection and administration of patents . . . .  ”).  
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emerged in both the private and public spheres, advising, 
strategizing, advocating or defending particular positions in 
domestic and international fora.22  In developing countries, the rise 
of a veritable cottage industry of TRIPS professionals endeavoring 
to shape national legal regimes to ensure TRIPS compliance also 
succeeded, in a few cases, in inducing the creation of new IP 
bureaucracies where none previously existed, 23  or in greatly 
expanding those that did.24 Private industry consultants, technical 
assistance programs funded from the public purses of the U.S. and 
European Union, and training programs by the WTO and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) established a 
cultural and legal orientation about IP that emphasized particular 
interpretations of TRIPS and sought to strengthen national 
enforcement prospects of the Agreement.25   
 The relative success of this socio-legal ordering26  ultimately 
heightened the political costs associated with TRIPS for aid-
sending and aid-receiving countries alike.  In the developing 
countries receiving TRIPS/IP training and advice, those costs 
involved threat of trade sanctions or the potential loss of foreign 
aid should recommendations from consultants not be followed.  In 
the developed countries, the political costs were reflected in 
contests between various agencies vying for control over national 
policy directions,27 in the intensification of lobbyists’ efforts to steer 
the direction of national strategies in the global IP arena, and in the 
                                                     
See generally DEERE, supra note 8.  
22  Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance (U.C. Irvine 
Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2014-53) 
(2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2507576. 
23  See, e.g., Business and Intellectual Property Authority, BIPA, 
http://www.bipa.gov.na (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (stating that BIPA was 
established to facilitate “effective administration of business and intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) registration . . . .” ). 
24  See also Bruce Reynolds & Susan K. Sell, China’s Role in Global Governance—
Foreign Exchange and Intellectual Property: A Comparison, (Research Ctr. for Chinese 
Politics & Business, RCCPB Working Paper No. 31, Nov. 2012) (noting China’s 
increasingly assertive behavior in IP global governance and exchange rate policy). 
25  See generally DEERE, supra note 8, at 13. 
26  See Gregory Shaffer & Susan K. Sell, Transnational Legal Ordering and Access 
to Medicines, in RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MARGO A. BAGLEY, PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 97, 101-05 (2014) (emphasizing the importance of considering 
transnational legal norms alongside international law and IP law). 
27  Arti K. Rai, US Executive Branch Patent Policy, Global and Domestic, in RUTH 
L. OKEDIJI & MARGO A. BAGLEY, PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 85, 89-91 
(2014) (discussing differences in approaches to pharmaceutical patent policy 
among US agencies).     
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unavoidable domestic tradeoffs (or pay-offs) incurred,28 including 
enlarged programs for IP agencies with seemingly unfettered 
discretion to deal with multilateral IP policy issues.29   
 The second development has been the resilience of local 
interests, sometimes working in concert with transnational actors, 
in identifying those domestic considerations that could 
successfully blunt the toughest edges of multilateral IP obligations. 
Unlike U.S. courts or agencies that rarely engage in meaningful 
analyses of international obligations in interpreting domestic IP 
doctrines,30 there is growing evidence that a range of countries are 
responding to TRIPS-related pressures by explicitly embracing, 
and then creatively limiting, the price that a maximalist global IP 
regime can exact from citizens and the policy costs it imposes on 
governments.31  As discussed in Part 3, these initiatives potentiate 
human development returns that extend beyond the creative 
incentives of IP rights to include recognition of new social 
freedoms, the hardening of equality principles in local laws, 
judicial independence, and a general democratic largesse.  These 
returns are critical components of an environment in which legal 
innovation can flourish.  What is more, they are flourishing in the 
precise institutional frameworks occasioned by, or deployed 
                                                     
28 J. Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the 
Uruguay Round 14-15 (Asian Dev. Bank Econ. & Research Dep’t, Working Paper 
No. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2002/wp021.pdf (discussing 
domestic tradeoffs involved in trade negotiations and contrasting this with 
concessions related to TRIPS).  As Professor Finger notes,  
[E]xchanging market access for intellectual property rights brings with it 
a more challenging domestic politics than do more traditional trade 
agreements.  It demands a broader domestic pay-off from winners to 
losers than trade negotiations have supported in the past.  It also requires 
that the benefiting domestic constituency be created by the exchange, 
something trade negotiations have never done.  Id.  
29  See United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO 2014-2018 Strategic 
Plan (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO_ 2014-
2018_Strategic_Plan.pdf (delineating the USPTO’s plan to serve as a model for the 
world and to collaborate with global IP partners). 
30  Geri L. Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of 
Trademark Rights, 91 MASS. L. REV. 18, 26 (2007) (“[T]here is scant case law in which 
a U.S. court discussed or applied the provisions of any treaty to a trademark 
dispute, and it is unclear how much weight U.S. judges will accord to foreign 
treaties and protocols unless the Supreme Court provides guidance.  Several 
courts that addressed the issue have expressly declined to apply the treaty 
provisions.”).  See generally Ruth L. Okediji, The Berne Convention in U.S. Courts (on 
file with author) (analyzing the limited impact of Berne accession in US courts).  
31  See infra Parts 3-4.   
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within, the transnational efforts created principally to enforce the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
 To be clear, legal innovation is also occurring in the developed 
countries and, as in the developing countries, these are not usually 
framed as a direct response to TRIPS.  Nonetheless, legislative, 
policy and judicial decisions, together with numerous agency 
initiatives, arguably represent national adaptation to a penumbra 
of pressures related to IP harmonization efforts since the 
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement.  Legislation such as the 
America Invents Act (AIA) 32  and institutions such as the new 
European Patent Court33 are notable examples of such adaptation, 
as is the rise of sequential IP plurilateralism.34  Still, other versions 
of legal innovation are evident in administrative plans and policies 
that identify the strategic priorities of bureaucracies ostensibly 
charged with protecting national IP interests, such as the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).35   
 What appears to unite efforts at legal innovation across 
developed and developing countries is the promotion of 
“bureaucratized and judicialized governance[,]” 36  which is 
innovation distinctively associated with administrative agencies 
and courts.  These institutions are typically imbued with broad 
discretionary powers and they have far less defined obligations to 
the primacy or coherence of the multilateral IP system.  Within this 
IP ecosystem established by the WTO TRIPS Agreement, legal 
innovation offers a fine instrument for defining sovereign 
responsibility for the effects of IP rights in society across both 
developed and developing countries.   
 Courts in the U.S., for example, have issued a series of opinions 
that clearly are in tension with the maximalist narrative of the 
TRIPS Agreement.37   As Professor Jerome Reichman has noted, 
                                                     
32  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
33  Council Agreement 16351/12, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 
O.J. (C175) 1. 
34  See infra Part 5. 
35  See e.g., USPTO 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, supra note 29 (outlining the goals 
of optimizing patent and trademark quality and timeliness and providing 
domestic and global leadership to improve IP policy, protection, and 
enforcement).  
36  See Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, supra note 22, at 2, 
10–14 (describing dynamic regulatory changes in transnational legal ordering, 
such as the shift in the “authority of institutions within the state”). 
37  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2120 (2013) (holding that a composition involving isolated DNA was not patent 
eligible); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229–31 (2010) (holding that a business 
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developing countries would fare well by imitating U.S. approaches 
in key areas affecting the supply of public goods, such as educating 
its citizens,38  encouraging competition 39  or otherwise expanding 
the public domain.40 Certainly, U.S. policy in these areas is far less 
maximalist than what some least-developed countries have been 
led to implement as TRIPS-compliant legislation.41   
It is important to note, however, that legal innovation is not 
always a one-way positive gain for public welfare.42  The difficulty 
in assessing which normative tradeoffs make sense in pursuit of 
the vision of the domestic public good, as reflected in the dominant 
economic justification for IP, is one critical reason for underscoring 
the importance of legal innovation by domestic actors.  The classic 
IP economic narrative is not a complete representation of the 
complex processes that qualify as innovation.  Values such as 
liberty, freedom of speech, equality and privacy also weigh 
importantly in the technological choices made by private firms to 
attract consumers to use technology and they should matter in 
how countries construct the scope and exercise of IP rights.43  More 
                                                     
method of hedging financial losses in energy industry is not patent eligible); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) 
(holding that a medical diagnostic method that added administering steps to a 
natural correlation was not patent eligible); see also infra Part 1.2.2. for additional 
discussions on the above cases.  
38  See e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Nurturing a 
Transnational System of Innovation, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 143, 162 (2007) 
(arguing that developing countries would benefit from “experimentally . . . testing 
different approaches to stimulating and disseminating innovation in their national 
and regional systems of innovation and to defining the relevant supporting legal 
standards that could prove effective for different players at different levels of 
development . . . .”). 
39  See e.g., Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 3, at 387–88 
(predicting that IP regimes that are compliant with TRIPS, but that also stimulate 
competition in developing countries will allow small and medium sized firms in 
developing countries to align interests across the globe and create greater 
competitive forces for larger firms). 
40  See e.g., Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private 
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 
316–20 (2004) (arguing that continued advancements in global technology are 
dependent on a functional transnational system of innovation, especially 
maintaining access to public knowledge goods and inputs). 
41  DEERE, supra note 8. 
42  Professor Julie Cohen has noted that the very arguments that advance 
access to knowledge can often be in tension with some social freedoms and can 
compromise privacy interests.  See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE 
NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2002).   
43  Id.  
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importantly, in the information society, innovation may flourish 
best precisely because there are no IP rights to control or repress the 
creative impulses of ordinary citizens.  Social media platforms, for 
example, operate less on exclusive rights over content and more on 
models that control how users function or experience these 
technological spaces. 44   The TRIPS Agreement does not, and 
cannot, provide specific rules to regulate these technologically 
mediated social spaces, nor can it direct the ways in which an 
absence of IP rights could engender innovation.  As a result, the 
extraordinary focus in the TRIPS Agreement on control for IP 
owners and the mandatory baseline that effectually transfers the 
locus of public policy decisions to private firms will regularly 
require – and motivate – new ways of conceptualizing TRIPS 
obligations at the national level. 
 
1.2. A Critique of Harmonization and Enforcement as Crowning 
Triumphs 
 
The TRIPS Agreement requires member countries to establish 
certain minimum, albeit robust, standards of protection for the 
traditional subjects of industrial property and copyright covered 
by the Paris and Berne Conventions.45  It also includes, for the first 
time, multilateral protection for undisclosed information 46  and 
strengthens protection for layout designs47 beyond the terms of the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits 
(IPIC Treaty).48  These new rules largely brought a measure of 
convergence between developed countries, although important 
differences remained. 49   Undoubtedly, the new normative 
standards alone were important improvements to the previous 
                                                     
44  For example, there is no doubt that many activities on Facebook may 
constitute violations of copyright; yet, the capacity to engage in such activities is 
what makes social media socially meaningful.  Id.  However, as Professor Cohen 
argues, this is not necessarily a positive turn.  See generally id. at 3–61.  
45  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 27, 27.1; see also Reichman, Universal 
Minimum Standards, supra note 3 (noting the prevailing protectionist bias currently 
shaping the international intellectual property arena). 
46  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39. 
47  Id. art. 38. 
48  Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 28 I.L.M. 
1484, May 26, 1989. 
49  Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 90–93 (1997).   
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multilateral regime administered by WIPO.  Nonetheless, they 
would not have significantly advanced the goal to impose 
discipline on the national IP choices of the developing countries, 
particularly middle-income countries such as India and Brazil, 
whose economies and firms had proven capable of competing with 
the IP-intensive sectors of the developed countries.  
 The piece de resistance of the TRIPS framework was a 
mechanism to discipline and constrain the policy space that 
facilitated cheap knowledge acquisition, such as through 
differentiated levels of protection for IP subject matter.  In order to 
be effective, this mechanism had to threaten, in a credible way, 
meaningful consequences for derogating from the newly 
established normative framework. Accordingly, provisions for 
enforcement and dispute settlement, including an outline of 
prescriptive and administrative legal tools countries should make 
available to rightsholders,50 were the crown jewels of the TRIPS 
Agreement.51  Finally, the Agreement arguably flattened the world 
by adopting the hefty non-discrimination principles of National 
Treatment (NT) and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN).52 
These incredible changes to the international IP system were 
based almost entirely on a foundation of untested assumptions in 
both the IP and trade disciplines, with short-term sectoral interests 
and political expediency as the primary checks on the negotiating 
demands and eventual compromises agreed to at the Uruguay 
Round.  With little to no knowledge, data or other evidence about 
the dynamic, long-term costs of IP harmonization for innovation 
and competitive growth, even for markets in the developed 
                                                     
50  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 41–61. 
51  See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] 
(outlining new rules for enforcing intellectual property and settling disputes); see, 
e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the 
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 
275, 277 (1997) (arguing that dispute settlement in the WTO, with adjustments, 
can be transferrable to controversies regarding intellectual property); see also Ruth 
L. Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law: Process Opportunism and TRIPS Dispute 
Settlement, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSES OF TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS 42 (E. Kwan Choi & James C. 
Hartigan eds., 2005) [hereinafter Okediji, Rules of Power] (arguing that transferring 
the enforcement methods of the WTO to intellectual property rules outlined in the 
TRIPs Agreement is a marked benefit); Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and 
the Sources of (International) Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 587 
(2001) [hereinafter Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement]. 
52  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3–4. 
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countries, the TRIPS Agreement created a garish monument to the 
reality of sectoral bargains and domestic pay-offs that had long 
been characteristic of multilateral free trade bargains.53  It did so by 
attempting to consolidate and freeze in time existing gains of the 
technological frontier and the IP legal baseline of developed 
countries.    
The Uruguay Round Final Agreement54 thus introduced two 
extraordinary realities to the world of international IP relations. 
First, the TRIPS Agreement portrayed IP regimes as insulated from 
demands for accountability to a larger global public law 
framework, thus framing domestic policy options as either “pro” 
or “anti” the objectives and requirements of TRIPS.55  However, 
setting the mandatory TRIPS obligations and flexibilities in such 
binary terms ignores the significant amount of creativity that takes 
place in the carefully constructed spaces where control and access 
are effectively balanced.  Further, it disregards the extent to which 
access to technology and cultural goods materially affects 
individual exercises of social and political rights vital to innovation 
and creativity.  As leading IP commentators and economists have 
long argued, the relationship between the production and use of 
knowledge cannot be sensibly divorced from the equality-related 
aspirations that define most of the societies in which IP rights have 
been an important part of economic and political flourishing.56 
Second, the TRIPS Agreement established a bartering regime 
for the domestic public welfare goals associated with IP through 
the celebrated Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).57  Now 
commonly known, exchanging heightened IP standards for 
concessions in trade, and even bargaining over non-compliance with 
                                                     
53  Finger, supra note 28. 
54  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994; THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 2 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 
1143 (1994). 
55  See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global 
Intellectual Property Norms, 39 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 69 (2008) (arguing that 
disconnecting IP regimes from broader social and political contexts may lead to an 
unworkable and fragmented legal framework, citing the Uruguay Round 
Agreement as an illustration). 
56  See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 58–59 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as 
the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public 
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 361–63 (1999). 
57  DSU, supra note 51; see also Okediji, Rules of Power, supra note 51; Okediji, 
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51. 
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TRIPS or WTO obligations, has become a feature of modern IP 
relations.58  Arguably, the possibility that member nations can pay 
for non-compliance with their international IP obligations suggests 
the incomplete nature of IP’s most ambitious harmonization. 
Certainly, the TRIPS Agreement has not produced the 
normative stability many imagined, desired or feared.  This 
outcome is largely attributed to a spate of judicial opinions in the 
developed countries themselves where courts have repeatedly 
drawn limits on a variety of IP claims for reasons ranging from 
freedom of competition to human rights59 and the utilitarian logic 
of the IP system.60  A number of disputes before the WTO have also 
illustrated the degree to which developed countries differed in 
their own approaches to the various standards set forth in TRIPS.61 
Ultimately, even the TRIPS text itself reflects incomplete 
harmonization. In several instances where legal or policy 
approaches between developed countries could not be overcome 
during negotiations, flexibility in how normative principles should 
be implemented was clearly expressed in the Agreement. 62  
Ongoing disputes63 will continue to test the extent to which such 
                                                     
58  The most recent example is the U.S.—Antigua dispute over the latter’s 
failure to comply with a WTO ruling.  Panel Report, United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW 
(Mar. 30, 2007); see also Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter United States—Section 
110(5)] (noting that a Member may request authorization to suspend concessions 
or obligations under Article 22 of the DSU). 
59  See e.g., Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 2599 (Oct. 18, 2011) (banning patents on procedures involving the 
destruction of human embryos).  
60  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109 
(2013) (explaining that without the rule that laws of nature are not patentable 
subject matter, “there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents 
would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation 
premised upon them.’” (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012)). 
61  United States: Section 110(5), supra note 58; see also Convention on the Grant 
of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254, as revised Nov. 29, 
2000, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013 
/e/ar52.html (defining patentable subject matter in the European Union); Patent 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 (Can.) (defining patentable subject matter in Canada).  
62  See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31 (“Where the law of a 
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties 
authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected[.]”). 
63  One example is a current dispute under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s (NAFTA) IP Chapter between Eli Lilly and the Canadian 
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flexibility remains a legal reality in multilateral IP relations.  
 
1.3. Patent Harmonization in the TRIPS Agreement and 
Competitive Equilibrium 
 
Most commentary on the TRIPS Agreement has focused on the 
minimum standards introduced, especially with respect to patents, 
where negotiations were the most difficult.  Here, the Agreement 
established minimum standards of patentability rather than relying 
on domestic law, like the Paris Convention.64  It expressly included 
process patents and, as noted by Professor Daniel Gervais, made 
any limits on patentable subject matter exceptional, thereby 
establishing protectability as the rule.65  Moreover, a new rule not 
previously in the Paris Convention required patent applicants to 
describe inventions in a manner sufficiently “clear and complete” 
to ensure a person skilled in the art could replicate the invention.66  
                                                     
government over the latter’s ‘promise of the patent’ doctrine.  See Kazi Stastna, Eli 
Lilly Files $500M NAFTA Suit Against Canada over Drug Patents, CBC NEWS (Sept. 
13, 2014, 8:44 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/eli-lilly-files-500m-nafta-
suit-against-canada-over-drug-patents-1.1829854.  Most commentators agree that 
this flexibility has been an integral component of international IP law and policy, 
both regional and multilateral.  See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Remarks at the 
108th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: Compliance 
of Canada’s Utility Doctrine with International Minimum Standards of Patent 
Protection (2014);  Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?  Eli Lilly v. 
Canada and the International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1121 
(2014).  
64  Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.4 (“Patents shall include the various 
kinds of industrial patents recognized by the laws of the countries of the 
Union . . . .”).   
65  DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
(3d ed. 2008). 
66  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 29.  This is equivalent to the PHOSITA 
standard in the U.S.  Despite the important disclosure function such a rule 
purports to advance, there are important normative challenges with constructing 
a hypothetical person skilled in the art that could carry out the invention and thus 
justify the information-for-protection bargain.  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1196 (2002) 
(noting that there are “several structural barriers that make it difficult for courts to 
accurately assess the level of skill in a complex technological art” and that judges 
and their law clerks are generally “at a rather serious disadvantage in trying to 
put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily skilled scientist”); see also, e.g., 
Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227 (2009) (noting that the interpretation of PHOSITA has 
transformed from merely practicing an art to researching and discovering new 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss1/3
OKEDIJI FINALIZATION_36.1(1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2015  5:36 PM 
2014] LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL IP 207 
This development expressed the stylized bargain between the 
inventor and the public that historically animated patent law 
policy in industrialized countries.67  Finally, the patent provisions 
included a general exception in Article 30, 68  modeled after the 
three-step test found in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.69  
Other important provisions include Article 31, which set 
safeguards on compulsory licensing, and Article 33, which 
harmonized patent terms to twenty years from the date of filing.70  
Importantly, TRIPS eliminated any discrimination based on where 
the invention occurred, including prohibiting discrimination based 
on whether the invention was locally produced or imported.71 
Understanding the breadth of changes occasioned by the TRIPS 
Agreement in international patent law requires an appreciation of 
how non-discrimination norms recalibrated the competitive 
opportunities of technology-intensive firms.  As noted earlier, the 
Agreement’s chief accomplishments were to supply and tighten 
the standards not adequately covered by previous IP instruments, 
and to link these ambitious reforms of the multilateral system with 
the reality and pain of trade sanctions.  However, the absence of 
strong institutions in most developing countries, the relatively thin 
policy contexts in which IP rights exist, and the stark power 
imbalances in global economic affairs justifiably raised developing 
countries’ anxiety about potential adverse consequences of a one-
way ratchet of IP rights.    
In short, concerns about the baseline established in the TRIPS 
Agreement for terms of access to knowledge goods remain deeply 
problematic in development circles.72  These concerns are certainly 
                                                     
and improved methods within that art).  In addition to being a peculiarly 
discipline-specific standard, it is hard to imagine that a construction exists that 
could meaningfully equalize the social tradeoffs of the patent bargain when an 
invention is sought in a developing country on the same terms as it may have 
been obtained in a developed country. 
67  Id.  
68  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 30. 
69  Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2). 
70  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 31, 33. 
71  Id. art. 27.1. 
72  These concerns remain strong in copyright law, where the consequences of 
policy decisions restricting access to cultural or knowledge goods may not be felt 
for at least one generation.  Prevailing economic wisdom suggests that suboptimal 
access to education, as an example, will produce an uneducated or ill-educated 
citizenry with corresponding challenges to a country’s capacity to absorb 
technology, ultimately compromising its socio-economic trajectory.  See ANTHONY 
CREE, ANDREW KAY & JUNE STEWARD, WORLD LITERACY FOUND., THE ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL COST OF ILLITERACY: A SNAPSHOT OF ILLITERACY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (2012), 
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justified in light of the unremitting efforts to further populate the 
multilateral arena with new IP agreements that seek to expand 
private control over critical inputs necessary for the supply of 
public goods.  As I describe later, authentic legal innovation 
illustrates that the same space within the TRIPS Agreement that 
was constructed to give countries room to enhance or strengthen 
TRIPS obligations can be reconstituted to give countries room to 
experiment with tools designed to extract welfare gains from the 
local environments in which the Agreement must operate.73  The 
ease with which the space to enhance IP rights is transformed into 
space to advance social welfare will be largely dependent on the 
nature of the tools of innovation that are utilized – legal 
institutions and processes, political fiat, policy instruments or 
appeals to higher normative claims.   
 
2. INDUCING LEGAL INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RELATIONS 
 
Part 2 provides an overview of various structural and 
substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, focusing in 
particular on foundational patent limitations.  Next, it provides a 
short explanation of how these provisions, along with the general 
infrastructure of the Agreement, have jointly defined the contours 
of legal innovation in developing countries.   
 
2.1. Legal Innovation and the Pillars of the TRIPS Agreement  
 
Three main features of the TRIPS Agreement appear, more than 
most, to have generated intense pressure on the welfare goals of 
WTO member states.  These features are directly responsible for 
motivating legal innovation in the developing countries and 
resistance in some developed countries.  They are:  (i) non-
                                                     
available at 
http://www.worldliteracyfoundation.org/The_Economic_&_Social_Cost_of_Illit
eracy.pdf (linking illiteracy with difficulty in achieving technological literacy); 
Philip Stevens & Martin Weale, Nat’l Inst. of Econ. & Soc. Research, Education and 
Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
(Geraint Johnes & Jill Johnes eds., 2004), available at 
http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/ 7087576.pdf (exploring the 
connection between education and economic growth). 
73  See supra Part 2.1.4.    
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2.1.1. The Flawed Architecture of the TRIPS Agreement:  Non-
Discrimination 
 
It is well known that the international IP world prior to TRIPS 
was rife with protectionist measures in favor of domestic 
innovators and markets.  Examples of historic and recent 
discrimination in procedural, administrative and evidentiary 
standards exist both in the U.S. and in other countries.74  Such 
discrimination is explicitly justified as protectionist measures for 
local industries, but it is also justified by the important goal of 
promoting access to the class of knowledge goods at issue for the 
benefit of broader societal objectives.  
The difficulty with a blunt non-discrimination rule as it exists 
in the TRIPS Agreement lies with the challenge of making ex ante 
determinations over which policy options designed to restore 
market equilibrium will, instead, distort it.  Even in the advanced 
economies, there is significant uncertainty about when an exclusive 
right will serve purely monopolistic conditions, thus harming 
competition and markets, or when it will meaningfully reward 
                                                     
74  Discrimination against foreign authors was a key feature of early U.S. 
copyright policy to aid in the development of a literate and educated society by 
ensuring cheap access to European literature.  It was not until the Copyright Act 
of 1891 that the U.S. extended copyright protection to works of non-U.S. 
domiciled foreign authors, so long as their home countries accorded comparable 
protection to works of U.S. authors.  The Act also extended protection to works of 
foreign authors if the U.S. joined an international agreement requiring reciprocal 
protection of the works of citizens from countries party to the agreement.  
However, protection for foreign authors and U.S. authors was conditioned on the 
production of their works within the U.S. (the so-called manufacturing clause).  
See  Copyright Act of 1891, § 3, 26 Stat. 1106, 1007 (1891) (stating rules and policies 
governing whether a foreign author’s work is capable of being copyrighted).  
Later amendments narrowed the scope of the manufacturing clause, but it 
remained in force until July 1, 1986.  In more recent history, evidence of foreign 
inventive activity was excluded as prior art under the U.S. Patent Act.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006) (repealed 2011) (limiting the use of prior inventive 
activity to inventions “made in this country[,]” i.e., the United States).  However, 
such geographic discrimination was eliminated under the new first-to-file system 
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
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innovation and incentivize future investment in research and 
development (R&D). 75   The dynamic nature of technological 
change, prospects of market failure, and changes in other 
macroeconomic variables also mean that policy adjustments may 
themselves occasion unintended effects not easily susceptible to 
judgment as violations of the elusive competitive balance TRIPS 
sought to codify.76   
Articles 3 and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement dampen the ability of 
countries to engage in overt distinctions between foreign and 
domestic innovators and creators.  The NT and MFN rules prohibit 
the application of different standards and normative rules with 
regard to the forms of IP available under domestic law and as 
between third countries and other WTO members.77  An immediate 
consequence of the NT and MFN rules is that developing countries 
cannot respond to local innovation by adjusting IP rules to reflect 
development levels as the developed countries historically did.78  
Moreover, non-discrimination principles eliminate the possibility 
that policy initiatives can target local innovation exclusively 
without triggering fears of trade reprisals under the WTO.  Of 
course, for the developed countries, such targeted policies are also 
proscribed, creating significant pressure to utilize forms of indirect 
favoritism through explicit regulatory schemes to promote 
domestic innovation, such as in the Bayh-Dole Act.79     
The fixed costs associated with investments in research and 
innovation are much more complex and difficult to pin down than 
instances of discrimination.  Accordingly, preferential treatment 
for domestic innovators tends to remain unexamined for possible 
violations of minimum international standards.  But even in those 
                                                     
75  Stiglitz, supra note 5 (describing consequences of information asymmetries 
on the neoclassical market equilibrium model in different areas, and noting the 
need for government intervention in policies regulating knowledge acquisition).   
76  Id. 
77  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3–4; see also id. art. 27.1. 
78  Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will 
the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115 (2009) [hereinafter 
Reichman, Twenty-First Century] (noting that developed countries, such as the 
U.S., started with far lower levels of protection than exist today). 
79  Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified in 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–212) (permitting universities, non-profits, and small business to 
pursue ownership of inventions arising from federally-funded research).  
Historically, developing countries have lacked the capacity for similarly 
discriminatory regulatory schemes but this is changing.  See generally Greg 
Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State (Fourth Biennial Global 
Conference of the Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law (SIEL), Working Paper No. 2014/29, 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2480664.  
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cases where discriminatory claims arise from legal rules directed to 
address unique domestic interests, such as the European 
Community’s challenge to the Fairness in Music Licensing Act,80 
developed economies have turned to a range of responses to 
deflect and defend against intrusive or disruptive obligations 
required by the TRIPS Agreement.  Indeed, as I discuss later, when 
faced with political stakes, developed countries may simply choose 
noncompliance with international obligations as a way to satisfy 
domestic interest group demands.  Whether developing countries 
have the political will to confront these instances of discriminatory 
policies in the developed countries is uncertain, even in cases 
where the developed nations’ practice of favoring local innovators 
is a clear violation of the TRIPS non-discrimination principles. 81  
As I have argued before, pursuing enforcement of TRIPS 
obligations is not a politically costless exercise.82  Choosing not to 
confront such examples of discrimination could reflect political 
wisdom, preserve developing countries’ own domestic 
discriminatory practices (or the opportunity to design them) and 
supply developing countries with strategic leverage in later battles 
with the developed countries. 
 
2.1.2. Legal Innovation and the Prohibition on Discrimination 
 
It should be no surprise that discriminatory treatment remains 
pervasive in multilateral IP relations. The TRIPS Agreement may 
have blunted the worst cases of discrimination between local and 
foreign inventors, but the mandate to treat innovators equally puts 
pressure on the very basis for competitive advantage in globally 
integrated markets.    Countries at all levels of development have 
adopted a range of measures and practices to safeguard domestic 
industries from foreign competition and to distinguish domestic 
                                                     
80  United States: Section 110(5), supra note 58 (finding that 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), 
known as the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, permits, under certain conditions, 
the playing of radio and television music in public places without the payment of 
a royalty fee inconsistent with Articles 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement).  
81  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (highlighting the explicit preference for 
domestic innovation in the Bayh-Dole Act – for example, see § 204, entitled 
“Preference for United States Industry”).  This arguably is an impermissible 
subsidy under the GATT rules.  See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994) (stating factors and rules to 
determine whether a subsidy is permissible). 
82  Okediji, Rules of Power, supra note 51. 
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innovators – and by proxy domestic welfare concerns - from the 
constraints of the TRIPS Agreement. Some legislative initiatives, 
such as the U.S expansion of prior user rights, 83  make explicit 
distinctions between U.S. and foreign inventors and are arguably a 
violation of TRIPS.84  Other measures, such as a reduction in patent 
application fees, are less clearly objectionable.85  Partly, it is how 
discrimination occurs that may make it more acceptable to trading 
partners rather than whether countries discriminate in favor of their 
citizens.  The micro-entity fee reduction in the AIA, for example, 
applies to foreign natural persons but not foreign universities, even 
though U.S. universities can qualify for the discount. 86   This 
ingenious distinction is legal innovation at its finest; an 
international rule is arguably violated, but not in a way that would 
justify the economic or political costs of the WTO dispute process.   
One clear consequence of the TRIPS non-discrimination norms, 
then, has been to divert discriminatory practices to institutional 
processes, similar to the micro-entity provision of the AIA 
mentioned above.  Various examples occur in other IP subject 
matter categories and outside the legislative context.  For example, 
in copyright cases, courts often adopt choice of law rules that 
prioritize the ability of American plaintiffs to exploit their works in 
foreign territories, regardless of the applicability of the copyright 
law of the foreign country.87  Another example is the European 
Patent Office Enlarged Board of Appeals decision in University 
Patents v. SmithKline Beecham, which gave the facially neutral 
Article 55 of the European Patent Convention a somewhat 
discriminatory effect, as the provision’s six month grace period is 
                                                     
83  35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012). 
84  Dennis Crouch, How the AIA Violates TRIPS, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/how-the-aia-violates-trips.html (noting 
that the expanded prior user rights are not available as a defense to a charge of 
infringement lodged by a U.S. university).  
85  Id. 
86  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, § 11(g), 125 Stat. 284 
(2011); see also Crouch, supra note 84 (arguing that discrimination between U.S. 
and foreign universities with respect to fee reduction may pass muster if it is 
construed as a subsidy.  However, it is ambiguous whether the distinction 
between a fee discount and a subsidy matters in the context of unfair trade 
measures under WTO rules). 
87  See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in 
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1999) 
(contending that U.S. Courts utilize choice of law strategies in order to apply U.S. 
copyright law to claims of copyright infringement that occurred abroad). 
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measured from the actual filing date of the European Patent 
Application, not any earlier Paris Convention priority date to 
which an applicant is otherwise entitled.88  Thus, applicants who 
file in a home country first and seek to take advantage of Paris 
Convention priority would not be able to benefit from the grace 
period.89 
Of course, diversion to institutional processes may backfire, 
requiring costly political actions. The Obama Administration’s 
veto90 of the International Trade Commission’s exclusion order91 in 
the Samsung and Apple patent dispute92 is a recent example of a 
facially neutral procedure that potentially reflects significant 
discriminatory impetus in favor of a U.S. firm.93  The complexity of 
regulating standard essential patents makes this particular instance 
difficult to present as an unequivocal case of discriminatory policy 
in favor of a local firm.  But this is, of course, precisely the point of 
the argument:  it is highly improbable that governments can tell ex 
ante whether a particular policy designed to address domestic 
                                                     
88  Case G-3/98, University Patents, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Biologicals 
SA (Eur. Pat. Office Enlarged Bd. App. 2000), available at 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/g980003ex1.pdf.  
89  Id.  My thanks to Margo Bagley for pointing this out to me. 
90  Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Rep., to Hon. 
Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013), available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013 %20Letter_1.PDF (vetoing 
USITC’s decision). 
91  Certain Elec. Devices, Including Wireless Commc’n Devices, Portable 
Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794 
(June 4, 2013), available at http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/ 
337/337-794_ notice06042013sgl.pdf (awarding in favor of Samsung and imposing 
a limited ban on importation and sales of certain Apple products). 
92  Litigation between the two companies has expanded to over fifty disputes 
in ten different countries, with potential damages of over $1 billion.  See, e.g., 
Australian Court to Fast-track Samsung Appeal on Tablet Ban, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2011, 
12:59 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/27/us-apple-
samsung-australia-idUSTRE79Q0SN20111027 (chronicling the ongoing patent 
dispute between Samsung and Apple in Australia and other significant countries 
in 2011); Chloe Albanesius, Every Place Samsung and Apple Are Suing Each Other, 
PC MAG. (Sept. 14, 2011, 12:59 PM), available at 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2392920,00.asp (noting the many 
countries where Samsung and Apple are currently engaged in patent disputes). 
93  This implicates a broader question of whether injunctive relief should be 
available for infringement of standard essential patents.  See generally NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013). 
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market imperfections will, instead, confer unjustifiable market 
power or competitive advantage to local firms and sectors.  
Moreover, even within the traditional jurisprudence of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), not every form of 
discrimination was proscribed.94  The TRIPS Agreement offers no 
similar guidance to governments regarding how IP policy can be 
used explicitly in permissible discriminatory fashion, what forms 
such discrimination can take in order to accommodate local needs, 
what domestic market conditions may justify interventionist 
policies, and what the nature and timeframe of those policies 
should be.    
Another approach to legal innovation with regard to the WTO 
non-discrimination rules (and indeed all other rules) is non-
compliance with globally agreed norms as interpreted by the 
dispute settlement process.  Non-compliance with a panel or 
Appellate Body decision could be viewed as a choice available to 
powerful states willing and able to risk the reputational (and other) 
effects of violations of agreed upon international rules.  In regard 
to the TRIPS Agreement, however, non-compliance is better 
viewed as a form of legal innovation that, in the short term, 
internalizes the political costs of derogation from TRIPS obligations   
or transfers those costs to other policy arenas or agencies.95   
For example, in U.S.-Section 211 Appropriations Act,96 otherwise 
known as the “Havana Club Rum” dispute, the EU filed a 
complaint alleging that § 211 of the 1998 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act was a violation of the TRIPS Agreement.  This provision 
prohibited the registration or renewal in the United States of a 
trademark if it was previously abandoned by an owner whose 
business and assets had been confiscated under Cuban law. 97 
                                                     
94  For example, GATT permits “the charging by a state enterprise of different 
prices for its sales of a product in different markets . . . provided that such 
different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply 
and demand in export markets."  See Interpretative Note to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XVII. 
95  See, e.g., Ana Radelat, Cuba Appeals to USPTO in Battle to Keep Control of 
Havana Club Rum Trademark, CUBA NEWS (July 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Cuba+appeals+to+USPTO+in+ 
battle+to+keep+control+of+Havana+Club+rum...-a0301479927 (discussing the 
conundrum faced by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
when asked by Cuba to suspend cancelation of its trademark registration until the 
embargo is abolished). 
96  Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002), available at 
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds176_e.htm. 
97  Id. ¶¶ 3–7, at 1–5.  
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Moreover, no U.S. court could recognize or enforce the assertion of 
such rights.98  Despite a finding by the WTO Appellate Body that 
§ 211 violates the NT and MFN obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement,99 the U.S has not complied with the ruling, which has 
in turn been the subject of on-going discussions100 at the WTO 
TRIPS Council.101  The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the 
matter, 102  leaving the question of U.S compliance with its 
international obligations squarely with the political process.  Such 
constructive disengagement with the multilateral process in the 
face of unyielding national political considerations is also a form of 
legal innovation.  
 
2.1.3. Legal Innovation and Scope of Patentable Subject Matter 
Under TRIPS 
 
On scope of IP subject matter, the most important change for 
patents under the TRIPS Agreement occurred via Article 27.  This 
Article requires countries to make patents available in all fields of 
technology, provided that the inventions are “new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application,” unless 
commercial exploitation of the invention would violate, among 
other things, “ordre public or morality . . . .” 103   Though this 
provision eliminated the possibility of significant limits on 
patentable subject matter, there is evidence that Article 27 is not an 
                                                     
98  Id. 
99  Id. ¶¶ 258–68, at 74–77. 
100  See EU, Cuba Spar with US over ‘Havana Club’ Rum, EUBUSINESS, (June 25, 
2013, 10:08 PM), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/wto-cuba-us-patent.pet 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (discussing controversy stemming from the US’ “failure 
to void a trademark law” despite the WTO striking down this law over 10 years 
prior to the controversy). 
101  The TRIPS Council, which is open to all members of the WTO, is 
responsible for administering the TRIPS Agreement.  Work of the TRIPS Council, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/trips_e/ 
intel6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
102  See generally Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d 
Cir. 2000).  
103  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 27(1)–(2).  The TRIPS Agreement 
also contains additional exceptions such as diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods, plants, animals other than microorganisms, and “essentially biological 
processes.”  Id. art. 27(3).  
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unbounded carte blanche to industry, 104  nor does it appear to 
inhibit constitutionally-driven policy limits to patents.105  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has creatively interpreted important policy bases 
for limiting patent subject matter eligibility in controversial cases 
involving new technologies.106  As I have argued elsewhere, the 
role of local institutions in balancing the incentive to 
commercialize innovation with interests underlying the distinctive 
policy goals of the patent system to promote the progress of society 
has been steadily redefined in recent years.107   Indeed, leading 
patent law scholars have noted that there is increasingly less 
consistency among both developed and developing countries on 
issues of patent subject matter eligibility. 108   Consequently, 
important room for legal innovation exists within the context of 
Article 27.   
Innovative responses by courts to an enlargement of patent 
                                                     
104  GERVAIS, supra note 65, at 341–53. 
105  See, e.g., Ass’n for Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 
(2013)  (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by 
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-Gen., Petition No. 409 
of 2009, (H.C.K.) (Kenya), available at http://www.escr-
net.org/sites/default/files/Judgment-Petition-No-409-of-2009 
%20Anti%20counterfeit%20case.pdf (holding that the Anti-Counterfeit Act 
violated the Kenyan Constitution because it precluded access to essential 
medicines and therefore infringed the fundamental right of life, human dignity, 
and health). 
106  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2116 (2013) (“As we have recognized before, patent protection strikes a 
delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and 
discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed 
spur, invention.’”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010) (“If a high enough 
bar is not set when considering patent applications of this sort, patent examiners 
and courts could be flooded with claims that would put a chill on creative 
endeavor and dynamic change.”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012) (“[T]here is a danger that the grant of patents . . . 
will inhibit future innovation premised upon them . . . .”).  
107  Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the International Patent System, in 
PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 
2014) [hereinafter Okediji, Public Welfare].  
108  See generally Margo A. Bagley, Patent Barbarians at the Gate: The Who, What, 
When, Where, Why and How of US Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Disputes, in 
PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 149, 150, 185 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. 
Bagley eds., 2014) [hereinafter Bagley, Patent Barbarians]; Dan L. Burk, Patent Law’s 
Problem Children: Software and Biotechnology in Transatlantic Context, in PATENT LAW 
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 187, 212 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014).  
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rights have not been limited to the developed world.  In a seminal 
case on the African continent, Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-General, the 
Kenyan High Court overturned a TRIPS-driven anti-counterfeiting 
statute 109  strongly supported by the United States and the 
pharmaceutical sector 110  in order to preserve access to generic 
medicines. 111   The Court explained that the statute did not 
sufficiently distinguish between counterfeit drugs and generic 
medicines, thus undermining the fundamental human right to 
health (i.e., access to affordable life-saving drugs) guaranteed by 
the Kenyan Constitution.112 
Outside the judicial context, biodiversity-rich countries such as 
China, India and Brazil have enacted laws that limit access to 
biological and genetic resources.  These laws are specifically 
designed to encourage downstream IP owners to share the benefits 
gained from such resources with the providing country or 
indigenous communities. 113   These innovations through the 
legislative process lie at the intersection of patent and 
environmental protection regimes, introducing new and critically 
important dimensions to national patent policies.  Even further, 
they have injected new momentum into negotiations at WIPO for 
an international instrument mandating disclosure of source in 
patent applicants when genetic resources have been used in the 
inventive process. 114  Although the precise scope of such an 
                                                     
109  The Anti-Counterfeit Act, No. 13 (2008), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 
97, 261 (Kenya). 
110  See, e.g., Suleiman Mbatiah, KENYA: Pharmaceutical Companies Pushing 
Anti-Counterfeit Law, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/kenya-pharmaceutical-companies-pushing-
anti-counterfeit-law (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (discussing the important role that 
multinational pharmaceutical companies played in Kenya’s anti-counterfeit law); 
World Anti-Counterfeit Day, U.S. EMBASSY BLOG: NAIROBI (June 12, 2012), 
http://blogs.usembassy.gov/nairobi/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (discussing how 
the U.S. embassy in Kenya has worked to promote the Anti-Counterfeit Act). 
111  Asero Ochieng, Petition No. 409 of 2009, supra note 105. 
112   Id. ¶¶ 75–78. 
113   Bagley, Patent Barbarians, supra note 108, at 176. 
114  The IGC, created by WIPO in 2000, held its first session in 2001 to discuss 
IP protection for genetic resources (GRs), traditional knowledge (TK), and 
traditional cultural expressions (TCEs).  World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore [hereinafter IGC], 1st Sess., WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1 (Apr. 30–May 3, 2001), available at 
http://wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=4295.  The IGC’s current 
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international disclosure requirement remains highly contested, the 
geopolitical space already subject to a disclosure requirement is 
significant.  If successful at WIPO, the work of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property, Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) will 
represent a seminal international agreement springing from the 
national laws of the major emerging economies.  It will also 
reinforce the growing need for multilateral IP norms to align with 
relevant international regimes or face being disrupted when those 
norms invariably become a part of national obligations in key 
countries.  Already the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD),115 which recognizes sovereign rights over natural resources 
in member states, and the recent entry into force of the Nagoya 
Protocol,116 have engendered a powerful set of international norms 
                                                     
mandate from WIPO is to work on “text-based negotiations . . . [to] reach[] [an] 
agreement on a text(s) of an international legal instruments(s) which will ensure 
the effective protection of GRs, TK, and TCEs.”  WIPO, Matters Concerning the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), 43rd Sess., at Annex D, 2, WIPO Doc. 
WO/GA/43/14 (Aug. 14, 2013), available at 
http://wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ ga_43/wo_ga_43_14.pdf.  The 
most recent twenty-sixth session was held in February 2014.  WIPO, IGC, 26th 
Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/26 (Feb. 3–7, 2014), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=31362.  The latest 
draft text on genetic sources was submitted to the WIPO General Assembly in 
September 2014.  See generally WIPO, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources (Rev. 2), WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/26 (Feb. 7, 
2014), available at http://wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=267381; 
see also WIPO, IGC 26 Update: Negotiators Advance on Text on IP & Genetic Resources, 
IGC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/news/ 
igc/2014/news_0004.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (briefing the progress at the 
IGC’s 26th session).  However, the Assemblies could not agree on any further 
progress on text-based work.  
115  Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
116  Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (ensuring that 
indigenous or source communities are involved in the process by which materials 
and knowledge harvested from their environments are used); see also Catherine 
Saez, Nagoya Protocol Enters into Force, Will Be Tested in Months to Come, IP WATCH 
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/10/09/nagoya-protocol-enters-
into-force-will-be-tested-in-months-to-come/ (explaining the defining features of 
the protocol and highlighting potential points of regulatory friction in the 
international community). 
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that govern an important area of technological developments.117  
It is unlikely that the multilateral IP system can remain aloof 
from such muscular regimes.  What is more, it is imprudent for the 
system to fail to consider how national innovation addressed 
through other regulatory processes can cohere with the IP 
framework.  Regardless of whether the IGC process is successful, 
the rate of innovation and patent filings in countries such as 
India, 118  China 119  and Brazil 120  suggest that, whether or not 
knowledge from developing countries is formally internalized in 
the multilateral IP system, innovation based on traditional bodies 
of knowledge will invariably affect the strategies and practices of 
IP firms.  The emerging environment of the Nagoya Protocol and 
implementing national rules will create a de facto integration of 
those norms in the multilateral IP framework in a manner that is 
unlikely to exalt IP rightsholders’ interests over domestic welfare 
priorities. 
 
2.1.4. Legal Innovation and Enforcement 
 
Most scholars agree that the possibility of effective 
transnational IP enforcement was one of the major triumphs of the 
                                                     
117  The Nagoya Protocol establishes a legal framework for access and benefit 
sharing regimes to ensure that indigenous or source communities are involved in 
the complex web of innovation in which materials and knowledge harvested from 
their environments are used. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 116, art. 1 (“The 
objective of this Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to 
genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into 
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding, thereby contributing to the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of its components.”). 
118  See Statistical Country Profiles: India, WIPO STAT. DATABASE (last updated 
Mar. 2014), http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_ 
profile/countries/in.html (noting that patent filings in India exceeded 18,173 
applications). 
119  See Statistical Country Profiles: China, WIPO STAT. DATABASE, 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/ en/statistics/country _profile/countries/cn.html 
(last updated Mar. 2014) (noting that patent filings in China exceeded 561,377 
applications). 
120  See Statistical Country Profiles: Brazil, WIPO STAT. DATABASE (last updated 
Mar. 2014), http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country 
_profile/countries/br.html (noting that patent filings in Brazil exceeded 6,597 
applications). 
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Uruguay Round,121  giving countries an opportunity to sanction 
violators of agreed provisions. 122   The TRIPS Agreement has 
produced far less litigation between developed and developing 
countries than anticipated; indeed, most of the disputes have been 
between the developed countries, a trend few foresaw in 1994.123  
Further, among these disputes, compliance has remained uneven, 
especially by the U.S., which has yet to implement several panel 
reports to date. 124   This limited data suggests that neither 
determining what constitutes a TRIPS violation nor achieving 
enforcement on the ground is a simple task. 
Several reasons may explain the relative inactivity around 
TRIPS enforcement and compliance.  First, the enforcement 
provisions of TRIPS recognize the political costs of dispute 
settlement and thus explicitly promote settlement outside the DSU 
process. 125   Disputes between more powerful countries involve 
gap-filling exercises in which policy differences between the two 
are forcibly resolved, sometimes to provide political cover from 
domestic interest group politics that may have constrained 
appropriate compliance with the international norm.126   
Between two differently situated countries, legal innovation in 
dispute settlement may offer an opportunity to recalibrate 
particular expectations or secure promises that have yet to 
materialize in specific areas of international economic regulation.  
The United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute between 
Brazil and the United States, which resulted in permission for 
Brazil to suspend TRIPS obligations to the U.S., is an example of 
this strategic use of the DSU process.127  Cotton subsidies have 
historically been a sensitive trade issue for the U.S.128 Similarly, 
                                                     
121  See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 51.  
122  Id. at 277. 
123  See generally Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51.  
124  Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO 
Compliance Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 411–12 (2011) (noting that the U.S. 
has yet to correct its nine-year-old violations arising out of the Section 110(5) and 
Havana Club Rum disputes). 
125  Okediji, Rules of Power, supra note 51.  
126  Ruth L. Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 89 (2000). 
127  Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R 
(Sept. 8, 2004). 
128  Jasper Womach, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32442, COTTON PRODUCTION 
AND SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2004) (“To stabilize and support farm 
incomes, in the face of highly variable prices caused by fluctuating world supply 
and demand conditions, major crops produced in the United States, including 
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Brazil has a strong cotton industry and, like other developing 
countries, a high interest in better access to agricultural markets as 
part of the Uruguay Round bargain. 129   Bringing the WTO 
complaint and defending it vigorously was a form of legal 
innovation in itself and likely politically positive for both countries, 
quite aside from the merits of the case. Though the stakes for both 
countries were sufficiently high to justify the costs of undertaking 
the DSU process, the risk of cross-retaliation against U.S. IP 
industries was significant for the United States, which ultimately 
reached a resolution with Brazil.130 
Cross-retaliation in the TRIPS context leaves considerable 
uncertainty about the general efficacy of the dispute settlement 
process for developing countries, most of which have no 
meaningful recourse to address WTO violations by the developed 
countries.131  Whether cross-retaliation is a credible threat at least 
partially depends on the relative influence of domestic interest 
groups and IP-intensive industries on lawmakers.132  If the political 
calculation of the complaining country is wrong about the clout of 
domestic IP industries in the offending country generally, or of a 
particular IP sector, permission by the WTO to cross-retaliate by 
suspending TRIPS obligations is unlikely to produce compliance 
                                                     
cotton, have been subsidized since the 1930s.”). 
129  See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement 
on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 
451 (2002) (stating that Brazil advocated for the elimination of import restrictions 
and export subsidies). 
130  Steven Suppan, Unconditional Surrender: The U.S.-Brazil Deal to End WTO-
Authorized Retaliation, INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY, (Oct. 9, 2014) 
http://www.iatp.org/blog/201410/unconditional-surrender-the-us-brazil-deal-
to-end-wto-authorized-retaliation. 
131  See, e.g., Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an 
Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 403 
(2000) (claiming that developing countries have few mechanisms for forcing 
developed countries to comply with WTO obligations); Frederick M. Abbott, 
Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & 
Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 8, 2009), available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/06/cross-retaliation-in-trips.pdf (supporting 
the claim that developing countries do not have equal bargaining power as 
developing countries to enforce WTO obligations); see also Gabriel L. Slater, The 
Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating 
Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 
1365, 1377 (2009) (asserting that developing countries have few enforcement tools 
against developed countries, and advocating issuance of temporary compulsory 
licenses or suspension of TRIPS obligations as an alternative). 
132  Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 311, 340 (2011). 
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by the offending country.  Moreover, suspending TRIPS 
obligations is likely the least-preferred outcome of the WTO 
complainant.133  The credibility of a cross-retaliation threat with 
regard to TRIPS can be limited by the sheer complexity of applying 
criteria developed for goods (such as the principle that the level of 
suspension be “equivalent”) to IP rights that are not easily 
susceptible to valuation.134  Moreover, even where a developing 
country is able to satisfy the hefty requirements of DSU Article 
22.3, 135  cross-retaliation under TRIPS can affect interests of 
innocent countries, further complicating the political risks of cross-
retaliation as an enforcement option for the complainant.  
Consider, for example, that ownership of copyright in a jointly 
authored work belongs to an American author and a Brazilian 
author.  If the U.S. is the offending country, and cross-retaliation 
against it has been authorized, how would suspension of copyright 
protection in the work of joint-authorship by the WTO 
complainant proceed?  Particularly with cultural goods designed to 
be easily de-anchored from their place of origin,136 determining the 
national identity and value of the IP rights that can be suspended is 
itself an exercise requiring immense analytical investment.137  In 
addition to the complexity of determining economic value and to 
which country ownership of an authorial work should be 
attributed, the ease with which digital goods transcend borders 
makes it exceptionally difficult to police where goods embodying 
                                                     
133  See generally Abbott, supra note 131; Yu, supra note 132 (arguing that the 
negative economic impact caused from suspending obligations, and raising trade 
barriers, would likely be much greater on developing countries than on 
developed countries). 
134  Werner Zdouc, Cross-Retaliation and Suspension Under the GATS and TRIPS 
Agreement, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 515 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010). 
135  DSU, supra note 51, art. 22.3. 
136  Compare Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 
37 (2003) (holding that unaccredited copying of material from the public domain 
does not violate the Lanham Act, because “origin” of “goods” under Lanham Act 
§ 43(a)(1)(A) refers to the producer of physical goods, rather than the creator of 
the underlying creative expression embodied within those goods), with 17 U.S.C. § 
101 (2012) (defining a “United States work” to include works first published 
“simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation . . .” and works 
published by United States nationals). 
137   Frederick M. Abbott, Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Issues of Law and Practice, 
in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
536 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010).  
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suspended IP rights may end up and how they can be 
distinguished in the market.138   
The difficulties posed by cross-retaliation are not 
insurmountable.  In particular, Professor Frederick Abbott has 
explored particular kinds of IP that could be the focus of cross-
retaliation.139  Further, other benefits are obtainable from trade-
retaliation measures if the country’s market size makes such 
retaliation feasible.140 Cross-retaliation holds seductive promise for 
developing countries seeking to enforce trade obligations against 
more powerful advanced economies.  But, in choosing between 
enforcement strategies directed at IP-intensive economies, the 
power of IP industries, while significant, should not be the only 
factor in deciding what would work best among a range of 
retaliatory trade options.141  In short, the ineffectiveness of cross-
retaliation confirms the structural weakness of the bargain that 
developing countries struck when they exchanged strong IP rights 
for yet unfulfilled promises of access to agriculture markets, all the 
                                                     
138  A similar point was made by the arbitrators in the WTO arbitration 
known as “Bananas III” (European Community v. Ecuador).  “[I]nterference with 
private property rights of individuals or companies may be perceived as more far 
reaching under the TRIPS Agreement, given the potentially unlimited possibility 
to copy phonograms or use other intellectual property rights.”  Decision by the 
Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution 
of Bananas--Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of 
the DSU (“Bananas III”), WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, ¶ 157 (Mar. 24, 2000); see also 
Zdouc, supra note 134, at 524 (discussing the complexities of attributing 
intellectual property rights to specific countries under the TRIPS Agreement).  
139  See Abbott, Issues of Law and Practice, supra note 137, at 536 (explaining 
how to cross-retaliate against the TRIPS agreement). 
140  Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context: 
What is the Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations?, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 34, 64-65 (Chad P. Bown & 
Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010) (exploring the obvious retaliatory and compliance-
inducing goals of WTO suspension, but also concluding that the practice achieves 
other “ancillary objectives” such as compliance, compensation or sanction).  
141  But see Zdouc, supra note 134, at 525–26 (arguing that retaliation under 
TRIPS may have a “snowball effect” across a wide range of IP industries and 
galvanize a large enough coalition to pressure non-complying governments); see 
also Alan O. Sykes, Optimal Sanctions in the WTO: The Case for Decoupling (and the 
Uneasy Case for the Status Quo), in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 339, 347–50 (Chad P. Bown & Joost 
Pauwelyn eds., 2010) (discussing the political calculations and consequences 
governments weigh when formulating retaliatory action plans).  
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while still dealing with a power (not law) driven trade system.142 
Dispute settlement entails significant economic costs143 and the 
risk of loss can have consequences not wholly in line with the 
interests of a developed country complainant.  In China—Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights, 144  the United States complained that China’s customs 
measures for disposal of infringing goods did not comply with 
Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, which required that 
“competent authorities shall have the authority to order the 
destruction or disposal of infringing goods . . . .”145  The Chinese 
measures allowed seized goods to be donated to social welfare 
organizations, sold to the rightsholder or auctioned as a last 
resort.146  The United States objected to these practices, arguing that 
“Article 59 requires full authority to be granted to dispose of or 
destroy confiscated infringing goods . . . .”147   The WTO Panel 
rejected the United States’ argument, stating that the language 
“shall have the authority” does not mean the authority must be 
exercised in a particular way, and it certainly does not require it to 
be exercised in the way the United States argued.148  Although the 
United States won on the other issue before the Panel,149 the real 
goals of weakening China’s regulatory and interpretive discretion 
and eliminating channels by which infringing goods could remain 
in circulation in China, and possibly beyond, were not achieved.   
   
                                                     
142  See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997). 
143  See Timothy Stostad, Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute 
Settlement in the WTO, and Its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
811 (2006) (discussing the costs associated with dispute settlement procedures and 
the barriers these costs place on poorer countries). 
144  Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China—
Measures]. 
145  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 59. 
146  China—Measures, supra note 144, ¶ 7.194. 
147  Id. ¶ 7.199 (emphasis added). 
148  Id. ¶ 7.238. 
149  Id. ¶ 7.139 (finding that the Chinese Copyright Law Article 4(1) was 
inconsistent with Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention (1971), as incorporated by 
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires that foreign copyright owners 
receive the same level of protection as domestic owners of similar protected 
works). 
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2.2. The Reality of TRIPS Enforcement:  Underwhelming and 
Political 
 
Despite initial excitement about the enforcement prospects of 
the TRIPS Agreement, “the reality of sovereign interaction is that 
diplomacy, power and domestic politics remain potent forces in 
determining whether and how states will comply with their 
international obligations.” 150   Binding dispute settlement under 
TRIPS was designed to facilitate greater consistency, predictability 
and enforcement of international IP norms.  But, the process 
established by the DSU encourages countries to settle disputes 
through diplomatic channels to avoid unduly straining the WTO 
system.  This practice has in turn produced inconsistent, non-
transparent and unpredictable outcomes even between countries 
with similar alleged violations. 151   Moreover, as noted earlier, 
private bartering over TRIPS violations has been an important 
component of contemporary trade relations, especially among 
developed countries in disputes with one another, 152  while 
disputes between developed and developing countries have 
seemed more likely to invoke the full gamut of the formal DSU 
process.153  Developed countries have leveraged the DSU process to 
exert pressure on developing countries and extract compliance in 
ways that escape the scrutiny of the international community.154  
                                                     
150  Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51, at 634. 
151  Id. at 617. 
152  See, e.g., United States—Section 110(5), supra note 58 (outlining the United 
States’ measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting 
services and the United States failure to comply with DSB recommendations and 
rulings).  
153  See Stostad, supra note 143, at 830 (stating that the WTO has increased the 
probability of disputes being filed against developing countries by 4.7 times). 
154  Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 51, at 617.  Even mere threats 
of invoking the DSU process have accomplished compliance in some developing 
countries.  See Rufus H. Yerxa & Demetrios J. Marantis, Assessing the New WTO 
Dispute System: A U.S. Perspective, 32 INT’L L. 795, 808–09 (1998) (discussing the 
effectiveness of threatening to file a case to induce WTO-consistent behavior from 
another country).  Developing countries are often at a bargaining disadvantage 
because they rely on developed countries for financial aid and military assistance.  
See Hansel T. Pham, Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation 
in the DSU, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 347 (2004) (discussing the theoretical 
benefits of the DSU’s objective goal of limiting dispute to legal issues and 
insulating developing countries from political pressure). 
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The fact that the DSU emphasizes opt-out possibilities and 
encourages extra-legal resolution of disputes suggests that the 
reality of diplomacy and politics as vital components of 
cooperative relations between sovereign states was not lost to the 
TRIPS negotiators. 
From 2005 to 2011, 419 total WTO challenges were brought 
under the DSU process, of which there were only 29 IP challenges. 
Twenty of the IP challenges were against developed countries.155  
As Professor Pauwelyn notes, the expectation of an enforcement 
onslaught against developing countries has not materialized; only 
9 of the 27 TRIPS disputes were North-South cases.156  Finally, of all 
the IP disputes, only 8 matters were pursued to a WTO decision, 
and all but one found a violation.157  These statistics confirm that 
(1) TRIPS enforcement was neither the crowning triumph nor the 
devastating disaster that some critics predicted; and (2) that 
diplomacy, politics and the developed-developing country power 
imbalance remain strong factors in TRIPS enforcement and 
compliance, but that the balance of strategic interests could flow to 
either party.  There is no set stage or script that would advantage 
one party over another, and legal innovation by courts and IP 
agencies reflect the capacity to reset the normative global IP 
balance, even if indirectly. 
In sum, except in a few instances, dispute settlement under 
TRIPS has not proven to be an outright victory for developed 
countries as might have been anticipated in 1994.  Instead, this 
crown jewel of the demandeur countries has become a potentially 
valuable tool to all countries, opening explicit room for discretion 
and legal innovation even in areas that the TRIPS Agreement was 
not intended to explicitly address or proscribe.   
 
 
                                                     
155  Lee, supra note 124, at 405; see also Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but 
Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, in RESOLUTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES (Jacques de Werra ed., 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708026 (comparing high expectations with the less 
successful reality of settling IP disputes under TRIPS). 
156  Pauwelyn, supra note 155, at 6 (“Secondly, the onslaught of IP 
enforcement by developed countries against developing countries did not 
materialize.  Only 9 of the 27 TRIPS disputes (and 4 of the 9 TRIPS panels) were 
North-South cases.”). 
157  Id. 
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2.3. The Triumph of Legislation in Developing Countries 
 
 If dispute settlement and compliance have been unremarkable 
in the past twenty-one years, what change did the TRIPS 
Agreement effect? Among most developing countries, TRIPS-
required IP legislation was adopted relatively promptly (some may 
argue too quickly in many cases).158  This included pharmaceutical 
patent legislation even in countries whose generic industries were 
most threatened by the new global norms, namely Brazil and 
India.159 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil provided very limited 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products and processes.160  Its 
prompt compliance with the new international rules allowed 
pharmaceutical patent owners to start filing applications in Brazil 
immediately.  These applications were largely ignored until 2001 
when new legislation mandated regular examination of chemical 
and pharmaceutical product patents.161  The same law, however, 
declared that pharmaceutical and chemical process applications 
would be rejected, because TRIPS only referred to product 
patents.162  A separate law provided that applications based on 
foreign pharmaceutical product patents would be granted without 
                                                     
158  SISULE F. MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, 
INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN 
TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 7–8 
(2005) (stating that a majority of developing countries had established patent 
legislation meeting TRIPS requirements prior to the deadline). 
159  India’s initial efforts to implement the mailbox system generated the first 
TRIPS dispute.  See Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) 
(recommending India bring its regime up to TRIPS standards).  The United States 
brought a claim against India alleging that it had failed to implement the required 
legislation.  Id.  A WTO Appellate Body decision agreed.  Id.  For a compelling 
analysis of this seminal decision, see Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement After US v. India, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585 (1998). 
160  Claudia Schulz & Mark Wu, The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property 
Protection in Brazil, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 100, 100 (2004). 
161  Id. 
162  Lei No. 10.196 de 14 de Fevereiro de 2001 (Braz.); see also Schulz, supra 
note 160, at 100–01 (describing the difficulty of the implementation in Brazil of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which should have been incorporated immediately into 
domestic law, but was not, due to misunderstandings at the Brazil Patent and 
Trademark Office). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
OKEDIJI (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2015  5:36 PM 
228 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:1 
a secondary novelty requirement.163  However, Brazil did maintain 
a local working requirement, which authorizes compulsory 
licensing if a patentee fails to work the patent locally.164  The U.S. 
alleged this local working aspect of Brazilian patent law violated 
the TRIPS Agreement and brought a complaint pursuant to the 
DSU.165  Brazil argued that the provisions were necessary to help it 
protect against the threat of HIV/AIDS consistent with the terms of 
the TRIPS Agreement.166  The United States later withdrew the 
complaint,167 leaving the issue an open question of international 
patent law168 and adding to the possible innovative responses to 
deal with specific national interests.169 Indeed, the United States’ 
withdrawal could have been motivated by a political calculation 
that the risks of a WTO finding that local working requirements 
are TRIPS consistent would only encourage other countries to 
adopt a similar domestic policy.170 
                                                     
163  Schulz, supra note 160, at 101. 
164  Id. 
165  Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). 
166  Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001); see also GERVAIS, supra note 65, at 
340 (“During the dispute, Brazil defended their ‘local working’ requirement as 
necessary to ensure access to medicines, especially in light of the threat 
HIV/AIDS posed to Brazil.”) (footnote omitted). 
167  Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 365, 366 n.4 (2002).  
168  The Paris Convention allowed member states to impose compulsory 
licenses for failure to work a patent after a delay.  Paris Convention, supra note 1, 
art. 5A.  
169  It seems clear that local working requirements are not a violation of the 
prohibition of discrimination under Article 27(1).  See GERVAIS, supra note 65, at 
340 (“It can be inferred from art. 27(1) that importation must be accepted among 
the WTO members [sic] states as a legally effective working of a patent under 
national law.”). 
170  A U.S. government report states that the reason for withdrawal was a 
commitment from Brazil to provide advance notice and consult with the U.S. if it 
chooses to issue a compulsory license for failure to work a patent.  See U.S. TRADE 
REP., THE 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 33 
(2005) (discussing intellectual property rights protection for patents and 
trademarks).   Arguably, this underscores the real interest of the United States: 
constraining unilateral exercises of discretion even when they are within the 
permissible boundaries of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Like Brazil, the pre-TRIPS patent law adopted in India in 1970 
contained an express prohibition on pharmaceutical product 
patents, but allowed limited duration pharmaceutical process 
patents. 171   As a result, India became a globally recognized 
producer of low-priced generic pharmaceuticals,172 supplying its 
own vast national market and much of the developing world as 
well.  When India joined the WTO in 1995, it made three major 
amendments to the Patents Act of 1970 to comply with its TRIPS 
obligations. 173   The first allowed applicants to file for 
pharmaceutical product patents for which they could be awarded 
exclusive marketing rights for five years from the date of the 
patent grant. 174   The second amendment provided for a 
twenty-year patent term, reversal of the burden of proof for 
process patent infringement from the patentee to the alleged 
infringer, and modifications to compulsory licensing 
requirements. 175   In 2005, a third amendment offered patent 
protection to pharmaceuticals and made India “substantially 
compliant with TRIPS.”176 
Although some TRIPS proponents expressed skepticism as to 
whether developing countries would ignore or fail to enforce 
TRIPS requirements,177 developing countries have not ignored the 
legislation requirements, and indeed, many have exceeded them.178   
Even in Brazil and India, where national development strategies 
were purposefully designed around the absence of pharmaceutical 
patent protection, legislation consistent with TRIPS obligations has 
been adopted and foreign rights are being exercised in local 
                                                     
171  Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS 
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1576 (2009). 
172  Id. at 1578. 
173  V.K. Unni, Indian Patent Law and TRIPS: Redrawing the Flexibility 
Framework in the Context of Public Policy and Health, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL 
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 323, 330-31 (2012). 
174  Id. at 330. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. at 331.  
177  See, e.g., Charles S. Levy, Implementing TRIPS—A Test of Political Will, 31 L. 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 789, 789 (2000) (arguing that TRIPS compliance requires 
adopting an entirely new body of law for developing countries, impacting 
whether developing countries will conform and whether developed countries will 
hold nonconforming developing countries accountable). 
178  See infra notes 183–187 and accompanying text (discussing TRIPS-plus 
provisions in developing countries). 
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institutions.  Despite being the object of criticism and threats by the 
U.S., the reality is that since making its law TRIPS-compliant, India 
has issued many pharmaceutical patents.  The same is true for 
Brazil.  Legislative compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, to the 
dismay of TRIPS critics, has been widespread even in the least 
developed countries, which could have benefited from WTO 
extensions.179  
In short, global friction over TRIPS implementation has not 
been focused on whether compliant legislative changes have been 
adopted.  Rather, the friction is focused on the ways in which 
TRIPS flexibilities have been utilized, be they in the governing 
statutes, in the courts or in administrative agencies, which, as the 
following section suggests, are poised to be the leading 
laboratories of legal innovation. 
 
3. THE REALITY OF TRIPS:  INSTITUTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Part 3 presents three case studies of legal innovation in three 
countries:  India, Brazil and Malta.  Together, these nations 
highlight how legal innovation can be achieved through judicial 
processes, institutional action or industrial policy. Ultimately, each 
of these case studies exemplifies the role of legal innovation in 
shaping national development strategies and domestic policy 
prerogatives.  Lastly, Part 3 presents a short explanation of the 
manner in which developed countries have resisted innovative 
efforts in the developing world and the justifications for that 
hostility. 
 
3.1. Legal Innovation in the Developing Countries 
 
Following the TRIPS Agreement, commentators voiced 
concerns that stronger IP minimum standards could constrain 
development, reduce employment and economic growth, threaten 
public health interests and undermine access to essential 
                                                     
179  See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 8 (“Over a third of the WTO’s 106 developing 
country members included a broad range of TRIPS-plus provisions in their laws. 
Over half of the countries in this TRIPS-plus group were LDCs—the same 
countries that the economic literature anticipates would adopt the lowest levels of 
IP protection.”). 
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technologies and knowledge.180  Critics warned that heightened IP 
standards would lead to devastating price increases in many 
critical imported technologies, such as seeds, medicines and 
educational materials.181  Furthermore, limiting the ability of these 
countries to reverse-engineer, adapt and build upon existing 
technologies from developed countries could impede national 
industrial development. 182   Beyond these concerns, developing 
countries faced significant financial and administrative challenges 
in implementing and enforcing the new standards.  Although 
TRIPS provides several so-called “flexibilities” that could have 
ameliorated some of these concerns, many developing countries 
did not take advantage of them—at least not explicitly.  Instead, 
many countries established laws exceeding the minimum 
requirements of TRIPS, colloquially known as “TRIPS-plus” 
provisions.183  Counterintuitively, nations with the least flexibility 
and the highest levels of TRIPS-plus protection are often the least-
developed countries.184   
A large body of scholarship suggests that countries deviated 
from their own local interests due to intense political, economic 
                                                     
180  See, e.g., id. at 9–10 (explaining that in advocating for weaker IP minimum 
standards, “developing countries sought to employ the same strategies of copying 
and reverse engineering that had served developed countries at similar stages of 
development” and that “[f]or the poorest and smallest countries . . . the potential 
economic returns of higher IP protection were a . . . distant prospect”); Molly 
Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 435–45 (2012) (arguing that 
TRIPS limits countries’ ability to “foster innovation and protect human health and 
welfare”) (citation omitted); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 
IND. L.J. 827, 828 (2007) (contending that TRIPS requires countries “to adopt one-
size-fits-all legal standards that ignore their local needs, national interests, 
technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and public health conditions.”). 
181  DEERE, supra note 8, at 9; THE FUTURE CONTROL OF FOOD: A GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND RULES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIODIVERSITY 
AND FOOD SECURITY (Geoff Tansey & Tasmin Rajotte eds., 2008); Ellen F.M. ’t 
Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way 
from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 41 (2002); Mohammad Towhidul Islam, 
Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in Bangladesh: Prospects and Concerns, 6 
MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 1, 6 (2009). 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 13 (“Over a third of the WTO’s 106 developing country members 
included a broad range of TRIPS-plus provisions in their laws.”). 
184  Id. (“Over half of the countries in this TRIPS-plus group were LDCs—the 
same countries that the economic literature anticipates would adopt the lowest 
levels of IP protection.”); see also id. at 100-02 (presenting in tables and graphs a 
negative trend between the strength of IP protection and countries’ GDP per 
capita as of 2003).  Many of these countries were beneficiaries of the largesse of 
the TRIPS technical assistance described in Part 1. 
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and trade-related pressures from developed countries. 185   For 
example, bilateral trade and investment agreements were offered 
to developing countries in exchange for agreements to forego 
flexibilities or implement TRIPS-plus standards.186  In other cases, 
where bilateral negotiations failed, developed countries resorted to 
unilateral coercion through threats of trade sanctions, diplomatic 
engagement and industry pressure from multinational 
corporations.187 
Despite a global environment fraught with tension and deep 
turmoil over the use of TRIPS flexibilities, it is unlikely that 
development gains can rapidly accrue based merely on adoption of 
normative rules in national laws, necessary though they may be. 
Some developing countries appear to have recognized this and 
embraced the need for progressive responses to TRIPS 
obligations. 188  Certain aspects of the political bureaucracy in a 
number of developing countries, for example, have cleverly 
imposed limits on national IP agencies that had proven more easily 
captured by the technical assistance bounty offered through a 
variety of transnational actors. 189   Further, local agents in 
developing countries, sometimes motivated by domestic turf 
battles rather than altruistic concerns over misguided IP policies, 
formed collaborative partnerships with the access to knowledge 
movement in order to exert their own pressures in the national 
policy sphere. 190  The capacity to recognize and curtail forum-
shopping by TRIPS entrepreneurs is a development that has been 
aided in part by the access to knowledge network191 and the highly 
                                                     
185  See, e.g., id. at 104, 114–16, 150–51 (chronicling a multitude of pressures 
that caused developing countries to adopt strong IP standards against their 
economic interests). 
186  Id. at 150–155; Land, supra note 180, at 442, n.45.  
187  DEERE, supra note 8, at 159–164; see also Okediji, Public Welfare, supra note 
107, at 58, n.30 (explaining how developing countries have used TRIPS-plus 
requirements over other types of agreements). 
188  See infra Part 4.2–3. 
189  See Deere, supra note 8 (describing ways in which IP agencies in 
developing countries are influenced by foreign organizations and rightsholders).  
See also Carolyn Deere, The Politics of Reform in Developing Countries, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 21, 30–32 (Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Pedro Roffe eds., 
2009); Pedro Paranaguá, Brazil’s Copyright Law Reform: Tropicália 3.0? 54–59 
(2014) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Duke University School of Law) (on file with 
author) (describing the influential role of rightsholders and copyright agencies in 
Brazil’s copyright reform process).   
190  Kapczynski, supra note 10, at 825–39; Deere, supra note 8, at 30–32. 
191  See, e.g., Letter to Francis Gurry, Dir. Gen., World Intell. Prop. Org. (Feb. 
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visible influence of IP interest group pressure on domestic policies 
in the developed countries. Institutions and new processes are 
therefore emerging in developing countries to challenge the 
dominant narrative of the substantive provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
Three case studies suggest the rise of legal innovation to 
address the welfare challenges related to TRIPS implementation 
and compliance.  These cases did not arise from the shadows of 
flexibilities, but rather from the sunlight of hard doctrine. 
 
3.1.1. India – An Example of Judicial Innovation 
 
 After India’s independence from Britain in 1947, it was left with 
a patent system that favored foreigners and a health care system 
dependent on imported medications sold at a premium. 192   In 
response, India’s leaders demanded changes to the patent system. 
A committee was appointed in 1948 to review patent laws to 
ensure conformity with identified national interests.193  Based on 
recommendations from the committee report, the 1911 Patents Act 
was amended in relation to the working of inventions and 
compulsory licensing. 194   A second report, issued in 1959, 
recommended radical modifications of existing patent laws, 
emphasizing the need to spur domestic innovation and to avoid 
international pressure to join international conventions requiring 
national treatment.195 
                                                     
7, 2012), available at 
http://www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.ghwatch.org/files/AfricaIPSummit2012_0
207.pdf (100 signatories, mostly NGOs, expressing "significant disappointment" 
regarding the content and organization of U.S.-backed Africa Intellectual Property 
Forum: Intellectual Property, Regional Integration and Economic Growth in 
Africa); William New, US, WIPO Training Programme on IP Rights in Africa Comes 
Under Fire, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2012/02/12/us-wipo-training-programme-on-ip-rights-in-africa-
comes-under-fire/ (detailing international reaction to the proposed African IP 
summit). 
192  Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of 
India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 491, 509–10 (2007). 
193  Id. at 510–11. 
194  Id. at 511; see also History of Indian Patent System, INTELL PROP. INDIA, 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/PatentHistory.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2014)  
(outlining the history of the Indian patent system from 1856–2005). 
195  Mueller, supra note 192, at 511–12; History of Indian Patent System, supra 
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In 1970, India enacted a national patent law prohibiting patents 
on pharmaceutical products. 196   By 1979, the number of patent 
applications by foreign filers had decreased to less than a quarter 
of the number filed in 1968.197  Conversely, the new patent law led 
to a significant increase in Indian generic drug manufacturing and 
a dramatic decline in the price of medicines sold in India.198  India 
soon became known as a “pirate” or “copycat” nation because 
generic drug companies could (and did) legally copy 
pharmaceutical products patented outside of India.199  The ability 
to copy pre-existing pharmaceuticals, with only minimal R&D 
investments and no patent royalties to pay, allowed these 
companies to produce drugs far cheaper than those of any foreign 
competitor.200  
In this patent-free environment, the Indian generics industry 
soared and drug prices plummeted, forcing many multinational 
drug companies to leave India.201  The number of pharmaceutical 
facilities skyrocketed, with over twenty thousand Indian 
companies supplying ninety-five percent of the pharmaceutical 
market in that country.  This resulted in huge boosts to India’s 
                                                     
note 194. 
196  Mueller, supra note 192, at 512–13. 
197  Id. at 513–14; Kapczynski, supra note 171, at 1577–78. 
198  Mueller, supra note 192, at 514. 
199  See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Selling Cheap ‘Generic’ Drugs, India’s 
Copycats Irk Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/01/science/01PIRA.html (describing the 
emergence of an industry of pharmaceutical piracy due to India’s relaxation of 
patent laws); see also Mueller, supra note 192, at 514 (“The eventual economic effect 
of the India Patents Act, 1970, was a dramatic increase in domestic generic drug 
manufacturing and a sharp decline in the price of medicines sold in India . . . .  
The ‘pirate’ label was unduly pejorative, however, and contradicted the basic 
principle of territoriality in patent law.  No violations of any foreign patent laws 
occurred so long as the copied drugs were made and sold only in India . . . .”). 
200  David K. Tomar, A Look into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute 
Between the United States and India, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 579, 584 (1999) (noting that 
India could produce a drug for as little as $90 million, compared to a price tag of 
at least $300 million in Western countries in the late 1990s); see also B.K. KEAYLA, 
Conquest by Patents, in TRIPS AGREEMENT ON PATENT LAWS: IMPACT ON 
PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH FOR ALL 9 (1998) (describing how, in 1998, the 
brand-name antacid Zantac was being sold in the U.S. for more than one hundred 
times the price of the Indian generic version). 
201  B.K. KEAYLA, Conquest by Patents, in TRIPS AGREEMENT ON PATENT LAWS: 
IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH FOR ALL 9 (1998). 
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economy and employment rates, with pharmaceutical companies 
directly employing five million, and another twenty-four million 
indirectly.202 
Over time, India’s pharmaceutical industry not only expanded 
production, but also grew more technically sophisticated.203  The 
industry developed expertise in reverse engineering drugs and 
rapidly diversified.204  However, because the manufacturing boom 
resulted largely from copying existing drugs, it did not result in 
increased innovation in new drugs.205  Today, R&D investment by 
Indian firms appears to be on the rise, although relative to Western 
companies, this investment is still minimal.206   Despite positive 
signs in the Indian pharmaceutical industry,207 commentators have 
expressed concern that the critical dominance of local firms could 
be lost in a recent wave of mergers and acquisitions purposefully 
designed to eliminate Indian generic competition in global 
markets.208 
The active role of the Indian judiciary in IP cases makes this 
outcome unlikely.  A highly controversial decision by the Indian 
                                                     
202  KPMG, THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: COLLABORATION FOR 
GROWTH, INDUSTRIAL MARKETS (2006) [hereinafter KPMG, INDIA], available at 
http://www.in.kpmg.com/pdf/indian%20pharma%20 outlook.pdf. 
203  Kapczynski, supra note 171, at 1578. 
204  Id. 
205  Mueller, supra note 188, at 515. 
206  Id. at 516, n.132 (remarking on the minimal R&D investment levels for 
Indian drug companies in the 1990s – around one to two percent of total revenue – 
compared to an average of fifteen percent among Western companies); id. at 537–
38 (identifying that while small Indian pharmaceutical firms still rely solely on 
reverse-engineering drugs, top Indian generic companies have increased their 
R&D investments, and Ranbaxy, one of India’s three largest pharmaceutical 
companies, spends around seven to nine percent of its total revenue on R&D). 
207  Id. at 537–41 (noting that (1) major Indian drug companies are increasing 
investments in R&D; (2) many patents worth billions of dollars will expire in the 
coming years; and (3) under India’s new patent laws, drug manufacturers can 
continue to copy pharmaceuticals available in the Indian market prior to 1995). 
208  See William Greene, The Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical Industry and 
Implications for the U.S. Generic Drug Market 8-9 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n., Office 
of Economics, Working Paper No. 2007-05-A, 2007) (observing that since the 
passing of the 2005 patent law, large Indian pharmaceutical companies have 
acquired foreign generics producers in first-world countries to better access their 
domestic markets, but small Indian pharmaceutical companies that were formerly 
engaged solely in copying are being acquired by domestic and foreign companies 
with broader market strategies). 
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Supreme Court, Novartis AG v. Union of India,209 illustrates the kind 
of creative legal innovation designed to establish a uniquely 
national-focused approach to TRIPS compliance and 
implementation.   
At issue in the case was a 1998 Novartis patent application for 
the anti-leukemia drug Gleevec, which claimed the solid (or “beta 
crystalline”) form of a compound (imatinib mesylate) previously 
patented in 1996.210  After the Indian Patent Office rejected the 
application, 211  Novartis appealed to the Indian Patent Appeals 
Board (IPAB).212  The IPAB affirmed rejection of the Gleevec patent 
under the now infamous Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act, 
which provides that a “new form of known substance” is not an 
invention unless it results in significant enhancement of efficacy.213 
On final appeal, the Indian Supreme Court affirmed the IPAB 
rejection of Novartis’s Gleevec application, clarifying that 
“efficacy” under Section 3(d) refers to “therapeutic efficacy,” 
weighed by strict and narrow standards.214  The Court held that a 
“mere change of form with properties inherent to that form” does 
not qualify as “’enhancement of efficacy’ of a known substance.”215 
Put differently, because Gleevec was merely the inherent solid 
form of the earlier known substance, it did not qualify as an 
enhancement of efficacy.216   
The United States and other countries have expressed concern 
                                                     
209  See generally Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 
(India), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/out today/patent.pdf.   
210  Pyrimidine Derivatives and Processes for the Preparation Thereof, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,521,184 (filed Apr. 28, 1994 as a continuation–in-part of an 
abandoned application filed on Apr. 2, 1993) (issued May 28, 1996). 
211  See Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Ltd., Controller of Patents and Designs, 
Indian Patent Office, Application No. 1602/MAS/1998 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1352538 (concluding in a judicial opinion to not 
proceed with the application for Patent No. 1602/MAS/1998). 
212  Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors., IPAB Order No. 100/2009 (June 26, 
2009) [hereinafter Novartis IPAB], available at 
http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/Orders/100-2009.htm. 
213  The Patent Act, No. 39 of 1970, as amended by Patents Act, No. 15 of 
2005, § 3(d) (India); Novartis IPAB, supra note 209. 
214  Novartis, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, available at 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf. 
215  Id. 
216  Id. 
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over this application of India’s TRIPS-compliant Patent Act.217  The 
international responses and accompanying political pressure on 
India over the decision have continued to play out on the 
international stage. 218   In February 2014, the U.S. International 
Trade Commission held hearings on the impact of India’s trade 
policies on U.S. economic interests, with a particular emphasis on 
the recent Gleevec decision.219  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
called on the U.S. government to place India on its controversial 
priority watch list, 220  which happened on October 14, 2014. 221  
                                                     
217  See Lisa Kilday, Global IP Reaction to India’s Rejection of the Novartis Drug 
Patent, IPWATCHDOG (May 28, 2013, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/28/global-ip-reaction-to-indias-rejection-
of-the-novartis-drug-patent/id=40778 (describing India’s Patent Act, the Indian 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the patent for Novartis’ drug Gleevac, and the 
debate as to whether the Patent Act is still TRIPS compliant). 
218  Id. 
219  Trade, Investment, and Industrial Policies in India: Effects on the U.S. Economy, 
Inv. No. 332-543, USITC Pub. 78 FR 54677 (Feb. 6, 2014) (Final), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/332/332_ 
543_notice02062014sgl.pdf; see also US Trade Panel Begins Critical Hearings on Indian 
Policy, BUSINESS STANDARD (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/us-trade-panel-begins-critical-hearings-
on-indian-policy-114021300075_1.html (describing the investigation by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission into India’s trade, investment, and industrial 
policies, focusing on India’s intellectual property rights regime as of 2003); US 
Trade Panel Launches Probe Against India’s Trade Policies, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Feb. 
12, 2014, 10:53 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-
12/news/47270048_1_indian-ipr-linda-dempsey-global-intellectual-property-
center (noting that the USITC began investigations into India’s trade and 
investment policies on the United States). 
220  U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM., 2014 SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 54 (2014), available at 
http://www.worldipreview.com/media/project_wipr/ document/special-301-
2014-gipc.pdf (“The Chamber strongly recommends that India be designated a 
Priority Foreign Country.”).  In a WTO dispute, the European Communities 
claimed that Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 are inconsistent with 
several WTO provisions.  See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter United States—Section 
301-310].  The panel found that Sections 301–310 were not inconsistent with U.S. 
obligations under the WTO.  Id. at 350.  The panel noted that its conclusions are 
based on U.S. administration undertakings in which the United States pledged to 
base any section 301 determinations on “panel or Appellate Body findings 
adopted by the DSB.”  Id. at 331.  The Panel observed that should the U.S. 
assurances be repudiated or removed, the “conclusions would no longer be 
warranted.”  Id. at 351. 
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Whether such a move by the United States is TRIPS-compliant is 
questionable.222  The fact that the United States is pursuing soft 
unilateral action, and not a WTO process, suggests it is not. 
Arguably, the Gleevec decision is simply a straightforward 
                                                     
221  See Biswajit Dhar & TC James, Inside Views: USTR’s Investigations on IP 
Rights Against India: Is There a Tenable Case?, IP WATCH (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/10/20/ustrs-investigations-on-ip-rights-against-
india-is-there-a-tenable-case/ (positing that India’s placement on the Priority 
Watch List by the USTR stemmed from concerns about “exclusions from 
patentability provided in Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, the use of compulsory 
licences and India’s refusal to introduce market exclusivity while protecting data 
on clinical trials before marketing approval is given to a pharmaceutical product, 
[and] inadequacy of measures to prevent online piracy of films.”). 
222  Article 23(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding requires that 
Members seeking the redress of violations “shall”: 
[N]ot make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, 
that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of 
any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except 
through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and 
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such 
determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or 
Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award 
rendered under this Understanding . . . . 
Id. at 22–23 (emphasis added).  The panel decision in United States—Section 301-
310 also emphasized the potential impact of unilateral actions on the WTO 
system: 
Members faced with a threat of unilateral action, especially when it 
emanates from an economically powerful Member, may in effect be 
forced to give in to the demands imposed by the Member exerting the 
threat . . . .  To put it differently, merely carrying a big stick is, in many 
cases, as effective a means to having one’s way as actually using the 
stick. The threat alone of conduct prohibited by the WTO would enable 
the Member concerned to exert undue leverage on other Members.  It 
would disrupt the very stability and equilibrium which multilateral 
dispute resolution was meant to foster and consequently establish, 
namely equal protection of both large and small, powerful and less 
powerful Members through the consistent application of a set of rules 
and procedures. 
United States—Section 301-310, supra note 220, at 325; see also Sean Flynn, US Uses 
Special 301 To Bully Ukraine, Likely Violating WTO, TECHDIRT  (May 17, 2013, 12:01 
AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130513/ 16505323067/us-uses-
special-301-to-bully-ukraine-likely-violating-wto.shtml (describing the United 
States’ listing the Ukraine as a “Priority Foreign Country” under Section 301 of the 
Trade Act to trigger investigations into Ukrainian trade activity and whether the 
proposed unilateral adjudication by the U.S. constitutes a threat intended to 
control Ukrainian behavior, which would be prohibited within the WTO 
framework in light of the Section 301-310 decision).   
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application of India’s domestic patent law pursuant to TRIPS 
Article 27.  After all, the TRIPS Agreement does not mandate 
consistency in how its minimum standards are construed, but only 
that they must be present in national laws.  There is no real 
controversy that India’s law and the Court’s application are TRIPS-
compliant.  Accordingly, the extent to which developed countries 
and firms have expressed dissatisfaction with the Indian Court’s 
ruling, and why the Gleevec decision occasioned such intense 
global debate, is particularly puzzling.223  One explanation is that 
in light of India’s competitive position in the generics market, the 
decision may appear simply to mask the kind of trade 
protectionism that the TRIPS Agreement was supposed to have 
eliminated.  Thus while the law and decision are unassailable on 
grounds of textual conformity, firms from developed countries 
likely find the spirit of the Gleevec decision inconsistent with their 
own perception of the “purpose and objective” of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
A deeper and potentially more troubling explanation may co-
exist with the first.  Back in 1994, developing countries negotiated 
the TRIPS Agreement in a context of extremely limited technical 
capacity.  Not only did IP issues not rank highly on the list of 
demands by developing and least-developed countries for the 
Uruguay Round, but IP issues did not attract the same level of 
social agitation or intuitive understanding domestically as, for 
example, the prospect of a bad deal in agriculture.  The lack of 
technical capacity in IP, coupled with the absence of a well-
mobilized domestic coalition, made compromises over TRIPS rules 
ultimately easier for developing countries to accept in the 
framework of a package deal in which enhanced market access for 
agricultural goods was exchanged for increased IP protection.224 
That some developing countries might have overcome this 
capacity gap twenty-one years after the TRIPS Agreement, and 
what to expect from those countries once that occurred, is not 
something developed countries likely contemplated.   
In reality, the framework in which contemporary international 
                                                     
223  See USTR, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 38 (2013), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%
20Report.pdf (“The United States is concerned that the recent decision by India’s 
Supreme Court with respect to India’s prohibition on patents for certain chemical 
forms absent a showing of ‘enhanced efficacy’ may have the effect of limiting the 
patentability of potentially beneficial innovations.”). 
224  See generally Gonzalez, supra note 129 (analyzing how agreements on 
agricultural trade were held hostage to agreements concerning other trade-related 
issues, including intellectual property rights). 
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relations unfolds remains deeply marked with vestiges of colonial 
rationalization that ascribe the basest motives to non-Western 
values, priorities, institutions and knowledge forms, or, at best, 
subordinates them to those that emerged from the West.225  The 
sociopolitical response to the Gleevec decision–the shock and awe 
it attracted–unfortunately reveals continuing skepticism (or 
surprise) that courts outside of advanced economies can credibly 
analyze IP doctrines and make intelligent assessments about what 
best serves the social values and welfare of their societies.  At the 
most elemental level, the overheated reaction to Gleevec and the 
ensuing threats of unilateral reprisal also fundamentally question 
the right of national judicial institutions to do so.   
 
3.1.2. Brazil – An Example of Institutional Innovation 
 
Brazil’s Anuência Prévia (Prior Consent) law, established in 
1999, created a unique and controversial patent examination 
process to comply with the TRIPS requirement of pharmaceutical 
patentability. 226   This system divides the examination of 
pharmaceutical patent applications between two agencies:  the 
National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI) and the National 
Sanitary Supervision Agency (ANVISA).227  INPI is responsible for 
examining the legal sufficiency of patent applications, analogous to 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.228  ANVISA, on the other 
                                                     
225  See generally Antony Anghie, “The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism, 
Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 445 (1993); Antony 
Anghie, The Grotius Lecture: ASIL 2010 International Law in a Time of Change: Should 
International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1315 (2011).  
226  The provisional version of the Prior Consent law, Industrial Property Law 
No. 9,279 of May 14, 1996 (Braz.), amended by Provisional Measure No. 2,006 of 
Dec. 14, 1999 (Braz.), was eventually codified in Industrial Property Law No. 
10,196 of Feb. 14, 2001, art. 229 (Braz.) [hereinafter Law No. 10,196], which limited 
the provision to pharmaceutical patents.  See Edson Beas Rodrigues Junior & 
Bryan Murphy, Brazil’s Prior Consent Law, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 426-27 
(2006) (noting that Law No. 10,196’s applicability was “confined to . . . 
pharmaceutical-related patents”). 
227  Law No. 10,196, supra note 226; see also, e.g., Rodrigues & Murphy, supra 
note 226, at 427 (describing how the shift to Prior Consent “partly vest[ed]” 
regulatory confidence in ANVISA where previously it had been solely vested in 
INPA). 
228  See Meet the INPI, INPI, http://www.inpi.gov.br/portal/artigo/ 
conheca_o_inpi (last updated Dec. 28, 2012) (describing the role and operations of 
INPI as processing, disseminating, and managing the Brazilian system of granting 
and securing intellectual property rights). 
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hand, is a separate agency devoted to protecting and promoting 
“public health” in Brazil,229 analogous to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration.230  Under the Prior Consent law, INPI no longer 
has the authority to grant patents on its own; rather, after 
determining that an application is patentable, it must forward the 
application to ANVISA for its consent, purportedly based on 
public health considerations.231   
However, according to a 2008 Resolution issued by ANVISA, 
ANVISA believes that it also has the authority to engage in a 
secondary analysis of patentability.  It claims, “[a]fter having 
received the patent applications submitted by INPI, ANVISA will 
carry out its analysis with respect to the prior consent thereto, 
assessing whether said applications meet the patentability 
requirements.”232  In other words, under the Brazilian two-stage 
examination process, two different agencies examine patentability 
using different criteria, with the second (ANVISA) likely being of 
lesser technical competence. 233   In effect, this system allows 
ANVISA to veto any pharmaceutical patent, despite an INPI 
                                                     
229  See The Agency, ANVISA, 
http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/portal/anvisa-ingles/anvisaingles/Agencia 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (presenting the myriad ways ANVISA protects and 
promotes public health). 
230  See What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 
2014) (“[The] FDA is responsible for protecting the public health . . . by helping to 
speed innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable 
. . . [and by] regulating the manufacturing, marketing and distribution of tobacco 
products . . . .”). 
231  Law No. 10,196, supra note 226, art. 229-C (“The granting of patents on 
pharmaceutical products or processes shall depend on the prior consent of the 
National Sanitary Supervision Agency (ANVISA).”); see also, e.g., Lisa L. Mueller, 
Recent Brazilian Jurisprudence Concerning the Scope of ANVISA’s Prior Consent, BRIC 
WALL (Oct. 14, 2013), http://bricwallblog.wordpress.com/tag/prior-consent 
(contextualizing Law No. 10,196 within ANVISA’s government mandate to 
protect the public health by preventing the production of potentially harmful 
products and services). 
232  Resolution (RDC) No. 45 of June 23, 2008 (Braz.). 
233  See, e.g., Eduardo Da Gama Camara, Jr., Brazil: Prosecution of 
Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Tensions Between the Brazilian Patent Office and 
ANVISA, MONDAQ (last updated July 22, 2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=253068 (arguing that the 
introduction of ANVISA patent review was a means for the Brazilian government 
to take control of the “sensitive field of pharmaceuticals” and that the argument 
that ANVISA is more technically qualified than INPI to evaluate the safety of 
pharmaceutical patents is clearly hollow: first, only 4% of applications submitted 
to ANVISA for approval are denied and second, ANVISA has contracted INPI 
examiners to carry out its patent analysis). 
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determination of patentability, resulting in a doubly unpredictable 
patent application outcome.234 
Following the 2008 ANVISA Resolution, INPI brought an 
administrative proceeding that contested ANVISA’s ability to carry 
out this dual patentability analysis.  During the proceeding, the 
Attorney General’s Office issued an opinion declaring that 
ANVISA should be limited to examining issues closely related to 
its institutional purpose of promoting public health.235 
In 2013, ANVISA issued a new Resolution, amending the 
previous 2008 ANVISA Resolution.236  The new 2013 Resolution 
states that ANVISA will review the patent applications “in light of 
the public health.”237  The application will be considered contrary 
to public health if it (1) “presents a health risk” or (2) the 
application is “of interest to drug policy or pharmaceutical 
services” and “do[es] not meet the patentability requirements.”238  
Although the 2013 Resolution more explicitly invokes ANVISA’s 
institutional purpose, it makes no progress in resolving the dual 
legal analysis because it lists patentability as an element of public 
health.239 
ANVISA’s implementation of the Prior Consent law for 
pharmaceutical patent examination could be viewed as a violation 
of TRIPS Article 27.1, which prohibits discrimination against 
particular fields of patentable technologies. 240   ANVISA only 
reviews pharmaceutical applications, and it denies approval to 
approximately 5% of those applications (usually all deemed 
patentable by INPI).  This suggests that ANIVSA is doing either (or 
both) of the following:  (1) applying a stricter standard of 
patentability than INPI, which may be discriminatory because this 
stricter standard thereby applies only to pharmaceuticals; or (2) 
applying extraneous considerations related to public health, which 
                                                     
234  See Rodrigues & Murphy, supra note 226, at 427 (explaining that ANVISA 
performs the second round of review, taking into consideration the impacts of a 
patent on social interests relating to public health, and that in the case of a 
disagreement between ANVISA and INPI over the patentability of an invention, 
the patent will not be approved). 
235  PGF/AGU se posiciona quanto às competências do INPI e ANVISA no 
processo de Anuência prévia das patentes de produtos/processos farmacêuticos, 
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 210/PGF/AE/2009 (Braz.). 
236  Resolution (RDC) No. 21 of Apr. 10, 2013 (Braz.); Resolution No. 45, supra 
note 232. 
237  Resolution No. 21, supra note 237. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.1. 
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may also be discriminatory because such considerations are being 
applied only to pharmaceuticals.241  
In addition to scholarly criticisms, the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) has also stated that the Brazilian Prior 
Consent system “raises concerns with respect to Article 27 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.”242  More recently, in a 2013 report, the USTR 
expressed stronger criticisms of this system and urged Brazil to 
adopt a more transparent and predictable examination process.243  
Nothing in Brazil’s controversial patent reform process thus far 
suggests this will happen, and nothing in the TRIPS Agreement 
requires such change. 
In a separate legal dispute, INPI is also attempting to “correct” 
the terms of certain agrochemical and pharmaceutical patents. 
When Brazil joined the WTO, like other developing countries, it 
was allowed a transitional period to introduce pharmaceutical and 
agrochemical patents.  TRIPS Article 70.8 provided that developing 
countries utilizing this transitional period must allow inventors to 
file such patents as of January 1, 1995, but that a decision to grant 
could be delayed until January 1, 2005.244  Pursuant to TRIPS, the 
term of any such “mailbox patent” is twenty years from the filing 
                                                     
241  See ANVISA, Propriedade Intelectual de Produtos e Processos Farmacêuticos: 
Situaçao dos Processos (Jan. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.anvisa.gov.br/medicamentos/intelectual/situacao_processos.pdf 
(displaying the progress of various patents through ANVISA review); Rodrigues 
& Murphy, supra note 226, at 448–54 (arguing that the Prior Consent Law is 
discriminatory and violates TRIPS). 
242  See USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 
33-34 (2005), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/20
05_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file383_7446.pdf (considering that Law No. 10,196 
“includes some problematic provisions, including a requirement that Health 
Ministry approval be obtained prior to the issuance of a pharmaceutical patent”); 
see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (highlighting the irony that a call for greater predictability of 
the examination process is coming from the U.S., where the patent administrative 
system has been under serious criticism about its shortcomings in stewarding the 
nation’s innovation capacity).   
243  See USTR, SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 223, at 45. 
244  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2 (“[T]he United States is concerned about 
recent regulations that provide Brazil’s sanitary regulatory agency, ANVISA, with 
the authority to review pharmaceutical patent applications for meeting 
patentability requirements.  These regulations appear to contravene an earlier 
opinion by the Federal Attorney General that clarified that ANVISA did not have 
this authority.  The United States urges Brazil to continue to work with 
stakeholders to ensure that its patent examination process is transparent and 
predictable.”). 
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date.245  Brazil adopted this mailbox consideration for applications 
“filed between January 1, 1995 and May 14, 1997”246 and did not 
take advantage of the transition period.  The mailbox applications 
were to be reviewed until December 31, 2004, and the term of these 
patents was set to twenty years from the date of filing, but not less 
than ten years from the grant.247   
INPI has been examining and issuing mailbox patents well past 
the deadline of December 31, 2004, and these patents had been 
receiving terms of ten years from grant.  Because of the delayed 
processing time, however, the effective patent terms have, in many 
cases, been much longer than twenty years from filing, the 
minimum established by TRIPS.  On September 12, 2013, INPI filed 
thirty-three lawsuits seeking a corrected term of the mailbox 
patents, nullification of the patents and a request to suspend rights 
while the lawsuit is pending.248  Many U.S. and EU companies are 
likely to settle.249   
INPI’s strategy reflects a novel use of its administrative power 
to roll back rights to the minimum required under TRIPS, despite 
the fact that Brazil had voluntarily established a system in which 
the extended term was clearly of its own making.  Since the TRIPS 
Agreement sets a floor and not a ceiling for patent terms (and other 
provisions), Brazil arguably has the right to “claw back” the longer 
patent terms.  Brazil’s ability to reverse previously issued patent 
terms that are greater than the TRIPS Agreement requires is a 
remarkable and unusual display of the degree of the innovation 
possible in adjusting national rules to advance domestic interests.  
INPI’s lawsuits also reveal, again, the sheer breadth of normative 
power residing in the highly technical and bureaucratic setup of 
national patent offices.250 
It is worthwhile to consider why Brazil exhibits such a high 
level of legal innovation.  Since the 1970s, Brazil has played an 
active role in seeking to limit the effect of the international patent 
                                                     
245  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 33. 
246  Law No. 10,196, supra note 226, art. 229. 
247  Id. art. 229-B; Industrial Property Law No. 9,279, supra note 226, art. 40. 
248  See Lisa L. Mueller, Gustavo de Freitas Morais & Justin Duarte Piné, The 
Problem of Mailbox Patents and Patent Term in Brazil, BRIC WALL (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://bricwallblog.wordpress.com/2013/10/01/the-problem-of-mailbox-
patents-and-patent-term-in-brazil (elaborating on the series of events leading up 
to INPI’s filing in the Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro). 
249  Confidential interview with a U.S. organization involved in the litigation 
by INPI. 
250  PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES 
AND THEIR CLIENTS (2010). 
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system on its development policy.251  As early as 1967, Brazil made 
a conscious decision that patent law would be its IP priority as part 
of a national industrial policy plan that included ensuring access to 
technology for Brazilian firms.252  Accordingly, the country was 
committed to a global system in which a panoply of patent options 
to facilitate such access would remain available.253  The evidence 
from Brazil since then has been consistent.  It has utilized every 
forum possible to advance development-related IP goals, while at 
the same time advancing protection for patents as the country 
experiences technological growth.  Brazil’s domestic calibration of 
its laws occurs not only through the Patent Act, but also by 
utilizing a series of institutional procedures that ensure the welfare 
of Brazil is at the forefront of its patent system.254   
By initiating and staunchly defending trade disputes with the 
developed countries, Brazil has established a norm of constructive 
engagement with the TRIPS framework and proven that it is 
comfortable with asserting claims that preserve its discretion over 
the appropriate balance between access and protection of 
knowledge assets. Brazil is willing to defend its domestic 
implementation prerogative as a core right of the TRIPS 
Agreement, making it difficult for advanced economies to make 
idle threats.255   The patent reform process unfolding nationally 
demonstrates the evolving role of patent law in Brazilian society;256 
it reflects the complex deliberation over the appropriate contours 
of patent policy for a country with a patent office that functions 
like those in the developed countries, but a society that reflects the 
welfare challenges of the developing countries.    
                                                     
251  See Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc A/C.2/L.565 (Nov. 8, 1961) [hereinafter 
Brazilian Draft Resolution] (“It is in the best interest of all countries that the 
international patent system be applied in such a way as to reconcile the legitimate 
claims of patent holders with the needs and requirements of the economic 
development of under-developed countries.”). 
252  Confidential Memo from the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, 
Mission in Geneva, Apr. 18, 1967 (declassified Sept. 12, 2004). 
253  See Brazilian Draft Resolution, supra note 251 (“Access to experience in 
the field of applied science and technology is essential to accelerate the economic 
development of under-developed countries.”). 
254  Law No. 10,196, supra note 226.  In addition to the self-actuated initiatives 
of ANVISA described above, Brazil also requires that technology-transfer 
agreements register with the patent office. Moreover, it has strong disclosure 
requirements for patents based on genetic resources.  
255  See, e.g., supra Part 1.3.1. (discussing U.S. WTO complaint about Brazil’s 
local working law and withdrawal of same).   
256  CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. & DEBATES, BRAZIL’S 
PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS (2013). 
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3.1.3. Malta – A Modern Example of IP as Industrial Policy  
 
Malta became obligated to adopt and implement the TRIPS 
Agreement in 1995 when it became a member of the WTO. 257  
Although the Maltese legal framework provides adequate 
protection for patent holders, 258  the relatively small size of the 
Maltese market historically discouraged many drug manufacturers 
from pursuing separate patent protection there. 259   Generic 
manufacturers are thus able to exploit opportunities to produce 
these unprotected drugs and ship them throughout the EU due to 
the principle of regional exhaustion that follows from the primacy 
of free movement of goods in the European Community.260 
Malta only recently became a strategically advantageous 
location for generic pharmaceutical manufacturing, based on its 
implementation of a Bolar exception as established in the U.S. case 
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. 261   Bolar 
exceptions generally provide infringement exemption for research 
and tests performed in conjunction with applications for regulatory 
approval.  Although Bolar exceptions exist in numerous countries, 
jurisdictions apply them unevenly.262   
                                                     
257  Malta and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/malta_e.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2014). 
258  Patents & Designs Act, ch. 417 (2002) (Malta). 
259  KPMG, MALTA: THE HUB FOR WORLD-CLASS PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 1 
(2011) [hereinafter KPMG, MALTA], available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/MT/en/IssuesAndInsights/Doing%20Business%20in%
20Malta/Documents/Pharmaceutical%20companies.pdf (explaining that Malta 
has become an ideal location for pharmaceutical companies to do business due to 
Malta’s “unique legal framework, solid incentives[,] and highly skilled labour 
market”). 
260  International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/export/international_exhaustion.ht
m. 
261  Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the traditional experimental use exception for patent infringement 
does not apply to pre-market testing done by generic manufactures and those that 
have been submitted to a regulatory agency). 
262  For a comparison of different Bolar exceptions, see Maria Chetcuti 
Cauchi, Malta’s Bolar Exemption: An Incentive for Investment and Innovation, THE 
EXECUTIVE, no. 32 (2011), at 7–8 (describing how different states within the EU 
have more narrowly and more broadly interpreted the Bolar exemption since the 
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The Maltese Bolar exception was adopted with a liberal brush, 
creating a wide exception that includes acts “consist[ing] of 
making or using such product for purely experimental purposes or 
for scientific research” and acts “done for purposes which can 
reasonably be related to the development and presentation of 
information required by the law of Malta or any other country that 
regulates the production, use, or sale of medicinal or 
phytopharmaceutical products.”263  This exception broadly allows 
experiments and scientific research.  Further, Malta enacted 
additional, pro-access IP rules within an enhanced institutional 
setting targeted at the development of a local pharmaceutical 
industry.264  
Malta provides an unusual case study for legal innovation 
within the TRIPS context.  Notwithstanding its generally strong IP 
rules, it was the combination of Malta’s investment in a solid 
business environment, implementation of key pro-innovation 
patent rules, and leverage of its geographical location to attract and 
build from technologies not protected domestically that 
transformed the country’s economic profile.  Since territoriality 
remains a cornerstone of IP protection, 265  the failure of large 
pharmaceutical firms to file patents in Malta presented an 
opportunity for the country to court generic firms.  As a result, 
Malta gained a reputation of being “the ideal location for 
pharmaceutical companies.” 266   Its pharmaceutical exports 
                                                     
EU set a lower bar with the adoption of a new European pharmaceutical 
regulatory directive in 2004). 
263  Patents & Designs Act, § 27(6)(b), ch. 417 (2002) (Malta). 
264  Malta extended permitted use to private and noncommercial use, as well 
as for any development and presentation of information.  The Maltese 
government made a strategic decision to work with local educational institutions 
to offer special courses to train workers in pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
pharmacology, and related courses.  The goal was to create a skilled workforce, 
which would in turn support a pharmaceutical industry.    Moreover, Malta 
enacted business-friendly laws including low taxes, worker training programs, 
and loan guarantees to induce generic pharmaceutical investment. Generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are the main players in this industry.  See generally 
Malta: A Healthy Location for the Pharmaceutical Industry, PHARMABOARDROOM (Jan. 
1, 2011), http://www.pharmaboardroom.com/article/country-report-malta-a-
healthy-location-for-the-pharmaceutical-industry. 
265  See Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate 
Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 153, 189 (1995) (“This is so because there 
is neither a central granting authority for intellectual property operating on a 
global scale, nor a central administration or a court system having worldwide 
jurisdiction over matters of validity or enforcement.”). 
266  KPMG, MALTA, supra note 259, at 1. 
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increased from just €26 million in 2005267 to €206 million in 2011.268  
The pharmaceutical industry in Malta today employs 1,000 people, 
out of a total private work force of only 110,000, and exports over 
€200 million in products.269 
The Malta narrative is insufficiently robust to draw any grand 
conclusions for developing countries in their forays in legal 
innovation. Nevertheless, Malta’s explicit framing of IP as 
industrial policy, if adopted by other countries, offers new 
justifications (and challenges) when evaluating the WTO-
consistency of particular interpretations or applications of TRIPS 
obligations.  
 
3.2. Assessing the Pathways of Legal Innovation 
 
India, Brazil and Malta are different countries and their 
interests in the multilateral IP regime differ in strategic intent and 
focus.  What unites the developments described above is an 
orientation of IP to focus on, and align with, domestic priorities.  In 
each of these cases, the tools of innovation are embedded within 
the larger national legal framework.  Thus, their credibility is less 
assailable by critics. That these tools are part of national systems 
also suggests they can be sustainably used in the foreseeable 
future.  In each example, the tools reflect a distinctive national 
strategy in which access to knowledge and national welfare are 
tightly linked across a number of related technical subjects (trade, 
environment, industrial policy and IP).  As a result, efforts to undo 
the accomplishments yielded by these tools, or to undermine them, 
are less likely to succeed in the short term given the spread of 
political risk across agencies.  Moreover, the tools are durable and 
agile because they are anchored largely in processes and not 
legislative text.   
In sum, in India, the tools of innovation include a coordinated 
arc of legislation, patent office action and judicial intervention.   In 
Brazil, it has been a highly sophisticated mix of administrative 
competencies and a policy commitment to access to technology.  
And in Malta, it was a decision to use TRIPS as a basis for 
                                                     
267  EUR. FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 
FIGURES: KEY DATA 2007 UPDATE 14 (2007). 
268  EUR. FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 
FIGURES: KEY DATA 2013, 18 (2013). 
269  KPMG, MALTA, supra note 259, at 1. 
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constructing an entire industry in which business interests and 
welfare outcomes have been, even if just temporarily, perfectly 
aligned. 
These public manifestations of how countries explicitly seek 
the welfare benefits associated with access to technology, access to 
medicines or access to knowledge suggest that, at least for the 
three case studies, the forms of legal innovation employed are 
likely to continue and will not just be episodic engagements with 
the multilateral knowledge governance system.  Further, the 
methods of innovation employed in the case studies above are by 
no means the only tools available—there are other forms of 
innovation that have been, and will continue to be, devised in 
developing and developed countries alike.  For example, new 
patent examination guidelines were recently adopted in Argentina 
for pharmaceutical patents that, among other things, instruct 
patent examiners to reject new use, new form and new formulation 
patents, somewhat along the lines of India’s infamous patent 
law.270  Other examples include “flexibilities-plus” rules adopted in 
some European countries, such as those limiting the scope of gene 
patents to the actual function of the genes (Germany), or so called 
“bidders exceptions” or “breeders exceptions” regarding plant 
variety protection laws.271 
The heightened local awareness of IP rights (in no small part 
fueled by the global access to knowledge movements), and the 
effect of IP rights on the fundamental conditions of human 
flourishing, suggest that developing and least-developed countries 
will have new levels of domestic public accountability to the IP 
regimes they negotiate globally.  Twenty-one years after the TRIPS 
Agreement, there are signs that the design of global IP policy, and 
the pressure to accept responsibility for its effects, will not be 
defined by the exclusive, private interests of firms in 
technologically elite markets.  A clear result of these expressions of 
legal innovation, notwithstanding reprisals by developed 
countries, is that a variety of new actors will have the space to 
participate in shaping the intersection between multilateral IP 
obligations and the domestic welfare imperatives that animate that 
generation and their communities. 
                                                     
270  See Adoption of Guidelines for Patentability Examination of Patent 
Applications for Chemical and Pharmaceutical Inventions, Joint Resolutions 
118/2012, 546/2012, 107/2012 (2012) (Braz.). 
271  See Carlos M. Correa, Patent Protection for Plants: Legal Options for 
Developing Countries 29–30 (South Centre Research Paper No. 55, 2014) (on file 
with author). 
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3.3. Legal Innovation as Hegemony – Resistance in the Developed 
Countries 
 
Even in developed countries, there is a lack of uniformity, and 
at times, a lack of compliance with the enforcement procedures 
that these very countries pushed for.  The WTO has found two U.S. 
violations of TRIPS:  (1) the WTO Appellate Body Havana Club Rum 
decision,272 and (2) the WTO Copyright Panel decision regarding § 
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,273 both of which have remained 
uncorrected for over a decade.274  The U.S. is an outlier in this 
context compared to other countries such as Canada, India, China 
and the EU, all of which have addressed their TRIPS violations 
within an average of 10 months.275   
As one of the most ardent supporters of robust enforcement 
procedures, the U.S. sets a poor (or perhaps from a legal 
innovation perspective, a “good”) example, especially when 
compared with developing countries that are required to use much 
scarcer resources to implement costly fixes.  In one regard, longer 
compliance times may positively signal the importance of filtering 
the decisions of international bodies through democratic processes 
that can better secure nationally meaningful compliance with 
TRIPS obligations.  Nonetheless, it is not surprising that dynamic, 
innovative economies at times find the TRIPS shoes too tight for 
comfort.276  Legal innovation has become more necessary in the 
developed countries as they struggle under the weight of a 
globalized market in which old political alliances are no longer 
sufficient to overcome the economic power and asserted political 
interests of the emerging countries.   
The vulnerability of Western markets to new systems, 
production networks and legal initiatives originating from 
developing countries across various public law regimes will 
                                                     
272  Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002); see also supra notes 96–102 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Havana Club Rum decision).   
273  United States—Section 110(5), supra note 58. 
274  Lee, supra note 124, at 412. 
275  Id. 
276  Reichman, Twenty-First Century, supra note 78, at 1119 (predicting 
correctly that “efforts to rig a regime for short-term advantages may turn out, in 
the medium-and long-term, to boomerang against those who pressed hardest for 
its adoption).   
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require that developed countries do more than simply dig their 
heels in IP maximalism.  Legal innovation does not emerge 
overnight; reform processes, advocacy movements and political 
engagement often take years to produce the type of tools witnessed 
in India and Brazil.  Furthermore, the calcified versions of legal 
innovation deployed by developed countries through threats of 
trade sanctions or aggressive diplomacy belies the strategic 
importance and superiority of legal innovation that occurs more 
indirectly in the developing countries through processes of 
engaging domestic stakeholders. 
 
 
4. LEGAL INNOVATION IN THE MAKING:  THE POSSIBLE INFLUENCE 
AND ROLE OF UNFORMED LAWS 
 
Part 4 presents how, in the wake of the TRIPS Agreement, 
multilateral initiatives such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) signal 
a new era of uncertainty in multilateral IP norm-setting.  There is 
value in briefly reviewing ongoing reform initiatives – ”legal 
innovation in the making” – to better appreciate the dynamic 
forces that interact and react to engender particular forms of 
innovation.  Part 4 thus explores prospects of legal innovation 
within the Brazilian and South African IP reform efforts. I posit 
that the political and social maneuvering associated with IP reform 
enables legal innovation to thrive by making national IP policy a 
subject of public discourse and engaging multiple stakeholders 
with relevant IP agencies. Ultimately, the uncertainty and fear 
generated in the wake of modern plurilateral IP agreements likely 
force countries to embrace legal innovation more quickly, and may 
herald the re-institution of more defensible norms in the fabric of 
multilateral IP treaties. 
 
4.1. Plurilateralism as Legal Innovation in the New Political 
Economy of IP Relations 
 
The rapid rise of networked information technologies radically 
altered many of the assumptions embedded in the copyright 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.  In its “bargain to the 
baseline” mode, the Agreement focused on the existing 
technological frontier and addressed copyright standards for a 
world that had been fundamentally restructured by the conclusion 
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of the Uruguay Round.  Tim Berners-Lee launched mosaic in 1993, 
just as the ink was drying on the TRIPS Agreement.277  With the 
high pace of technological advances in the 1990s, the TRIPS 
negotiations simply did not foresee many of the questions that 
would frame the contours of IP protection in the digital 
economy. 278   The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 279  and WIPO 
Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 280  thus were 
negotiated at WIPO to secure authorial interests in the face of new 
and evolving technological platforms; 281  the technologies most 
critical to political, cultural and economic opportunities today were 
not even within the orbit of the TRIPS negotiations.  As discussed 
below, terms of access and use of digital cultural goods have, 
nevertheless, been glossed with a similar focus on preserving 
private authorial control over the production and utility of 
knowledge goods. Differently from TRIPS, however, these terms 
emerged from a newly constructed political alliance of select 
developed countries. 
  
4.1.1. The Digital Gap in TRIPS and Sites of Resistance:  
SOPA and PIPA  
 
The WCT entered into force two years after the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round. 282   Still, the robust new layers of rights 
                                                     
277  STEPHANIE SAMMARTINO MCPHERSON, TIM BERNERS-LEE: INVENTOR OF THE 
WORLD WIDE WEB 66 (2009). 
278  Alex Shepard, ACTA on Life Support: Why the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement Is Failing and How Future Intellectual Property Treaties Might Avoid a 
Similar Fate, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 673, 676 (2013) (“Being a product of 
the mid-90s, TRIPS was not concerned with many of the technological innovations 
that would form the basis for modern digital copyright infringement.”); see also 
Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 265, 276 (2007) (remarking that when the TRIPS Agreement was 
created, it did not anticipate the future challenges “posed by digital technology to 
the protection and enforcement of copyright.”). 
279  World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, Dec. 
20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT]. 
280  WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT]. 
281  Sun, supra note 278, at 276 (“[T]he WCT and WPPT mainly set out 
provisions protecting the new right of making available, and the use of 
technological measures and rights management information by right holders.”). 
282  WCT, supra note 279. 
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provided by the WCT 283  could not satisfy the level of control 
demanded by copyright owners and could not keep pace with the 
social and cultural expectations of consumers occasioned by new 
technologies.    
Copyright reform efforts are now underway in a number of 
countries as nations attempt to tackle the challenges of the 
networked information economy.  The “digital gap” in the 
international IP system leaves policy space for a variety of forms of 
domestic legal innovation responsive to new digital platforms.  In 
the copyright arena, however, such innovation is not necessitated 
by the constraints imposed by TRIPS, but rather by a need to 
preserve policy flexibilities in a continuum of unknowns. This 
flexibility is necessary to respond to an ever-changing copyright 
landscape that affects economic, cultural and liberty interests far 
more pervasively than IP rights were presumed to do.  
Yet, as some countries experiment with expanding fair use and 
fair dealing exceptions, 284  Creative Commons licensing 285  and 
expanding access to orphan works286 to establish a “zone of access 
and use” that might accommodate the unwieldy intersection of 
personal liberty and copyright rights, other countries have tried to 
push back with restrictive, secretive international agreements that 
contain even more robust protection and enforcement provisions 
that incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement.  Many commentators 
have documented the notorious beginning—and end—of some of 
these efforts, but a brief summary will highlight a few instructive 
points and link them to legal innovation efforts. 
In the United States, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was 
proposed as a bill “to promote prosperity, creativity, 
entrepreneurship, and innovation by combating the theft of U.S. 
                                                     
283  See id. art. 11 (requiring protection against circumvention of technological 
protection measures); id. art. 12 (stating rights management information 
obligations). 
284  See, e.g., IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 4–5 (2011) (outlining an expansion of fair 
dealing exceptions in U.K. copyright). 
285  See, e.g., Pedro Paranaguá, Brazil’s Copyright Reform: Schizophrenia?, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/2011/02/08/inside-views-brazils-copyright-reform-schizophrenia 
(reporting the withdrawal of Brazil’s practice of Creative Commons licensing 
through the Ministry of Culture). 
286  Copyright (Amendment) Act, No. 27, Acts of Parliament, 2012 (India), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/ laws/en/in/in066en.pdf 
(providing for compulsory licensing of orphan works). 
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property, and for other purposes.” 287   It then points out in its 
savings clauses that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to 
impose a prior restraint on free speech or the press protected under 
the 1st Amendment to the Constitution.”288  SOPA’s counterpart in 
the Senate, The PROTECT-IP Act (PIPA), 289  was introduced to 
“prevent online threats to economic creativity and theft of 
intellectual property.”290  Though the Act did not have a specific 
First Amendment disclaimer as SOPA did, PIPA had strikingly 
similar provisions that, if passed, many feared would have had 
grave implications for First Amendment free speech rights and 
access to knowledge more broadly. 
For example, SOPA and PIPA would have allowed the U.S. 
Justice Department to obtain court orders in rem against owners of 
foreign websites suspected of enabling or facilitating copyright 
violations.291   Such orders against foreign websites would have 
blocked the websites without any opportunity to respond or 
appeal, resulting in censorship and a direct infringement on the 
freedom of speech. 292  The legislation would have not only 
permitted the Justice Department to shut down websites, but also 
to do so without due process given the in rem proceedings.293  
Proponents of the SOPA/PIPA legislation argued that existing 
provisions in the Copyright Act were insufficient to prevent 
infringing activity from foreign websites, and that websites 
facilitating downloading of pirated works hurt copyright owners 
as well as the economy in general.294 
Opposition and outright resistance to SOPA/PIPA were swift 
and unequivocal.  Opponents organized an Internet “blackout” in 
which Wikipedia, Google and over 115,000 other websites replaced 
their homepages with an all-black page protesting SOPA and 
                                                     
287  Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong., at 1 (1st Sess. 2011).  
288  Id. at 2. 
289  PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
290  Id. 
291  See generally, John Kennedy, Mary Rasenberger & M. Lorrane Ford, SOPA 
and PIPA—Attempts to Stop Online Piracy by Foreign Internet Sites, 1 INTERNET L. & 
PRAC. § 12:51 (2012). 
292  Id. 
293  Id. 
294  See Timothy J. Toohey, Piracy, Privacy, and Internet Openness: The Changing 
Face of Cyberspace Law, in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 97 
(2012) (explaining how Congress enacted SOPA and PIPA in response to media 
companies claiming that their legal protections for intellectual property needed to 
be substantially strengthened). 
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PIPA.295  Many view this protest as an excellent example of a more 
democratic, user-empowered nature of the global digital 
environment.  The moral, economic and political success of the 
corporations opposed to SOPA and PIPA reflected a new kind of 
partnership with the public interest that, for the first-time, rivaled 
the longstanding alliance of content industries and the U.S. IP 
agencies. That partnership – and the global reach of the “digital 
protest” – has indefinitely re-shaped the nature of the policy space 
available for IP.  At a minimum, the public is more emboldened, 
and the days in which IP owners can push changes to legislation 
without consideration of the public’s reaction are likely long-gone. 
Both SOPA and PIPA were tabled after the blackout protest, but 
strains of their principal goals are likely to re-appear elsewhere.296 
 
4.1.2. ACTA and the Political Gap in TRIPS:  Becoming My 
Brother’s Keeper 
 
Before there was SOPA/PIPA, however, there was ACTA, 
negotiated from 2007 to 2010 by the United States, the EU, 
Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Singapore, 
Morocco, Japan and South Korea. 297   The Agreement was 
negotiated in secret outside of the traditional (and more 
transparent) multilateral IP fora, such as the WTO and WIPO.298  In 
October 2011, eight out of these eleven countries signed the 
Agreement, with the EU, Mexico and Switzerland pledging 
continued support and vowing to sign “as soon as practicable.”299  
                                                     
295  Id. at 5-6. 
296  Id. at 6-7. 
297  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/acta (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) [hereinafter EFF, 
ACTA].  For a seminal volume exploring different aspects of ACTA, see THE 
PLURILATERAL ENFORCEMENT AGENDA: THE GENESIS AND AFTERMATH OF ACTA 
(Pedro Roffe & Xavier Seuba eds., 2014). 
298  Id. 
299  See Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
Negotiating Parties, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 1, 2011), available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2011/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag 
(detailing a press release explaining the proliferation of counterfeit and pirated 
goods, delineating the final round negotiations in Tokyo, Japan, and outlining the 
next steps for enforcing the ACTA); see also KEI’s ACTA Timeline, KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L, http://keionline.org/timelines/acta (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) 
(detailing major events, press releases, and commentary on the ACTA 
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The pledge of continued support may simply be lip service in some 
of these abstaining countries; for example, ACTA was firmly 
rejected by a 92% majority in the European Parliament in 2012 and 
improved public support in the future seems highly unlikely.300  
Other developing countries, such as India and Brazil, are also 
firmly opposed to ACTA and have criticized such efforts to bypass 
existing international IP fora.301 
In the copyright context, ACTA served as a model of the most 
troubling features of a new breed of multilateral IP negotiations: 
(1) nondemocratic process:  in addition to the secretive and 
exclusionary negotiation process, the actual enforcement, 
interpretation and amendments of ACTA would be controlled 
unilaterally by a non-democratic “ACTA Committee” consisting of 
unelected members from signatory countries only; (2) freedom of 
speech and censorship:  several ACTA provisions would increase 
ISPs’ liability for users’ infringing activities beyond existing law, 
which may encourage excessive filtering, blocking and interference 
with freedom of expression; (3) privacy and due process:  the 
agreement would increase the ease and speed of information 
exchanges between enforcement authorities, copyright holders and 
ISPs, which threatens the privacy of user information; (4) users’ 
rights:  ACTA would require legal protection against 
circumvention of technological protection measures, even if the 
reason for disabling the lock is fair, non-infringing use; and (5) 
excessive civil and criminal penalties:  ACTA would implement a 
regime of overzealous statutory damages with no proportionality 
to the crime and no exceptions for innocent infringement; criminal 
                                                     
negotiations). 
300  See, e.g., Don Melvin, EU Parliament Rejects ACTA Anti-Piracy Treaty, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 4, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-07-04/eu-parliament-holds-key-vote-
on-anti-piracy-treaty (explaining how other major countries such as China, India 
and Brazil were either not invited or have refused to join ACTA negotiations; also 
explaining how ACTA would end up restricting the ability of Congress to provide 
intellectual property reform); Olivia Solon, What Is ACTA and Why Should You Be 
Worried About It?, WIRED MAG. (Jan. 24, 2012) (U.K.), 
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-01/24/acta-101 (explaining how 
online activists have begun mounting online opposition to ACTA, with future 
opposition planned; ACTA opposed by online activists, internet companies, and 
members of the European Parliament); see also EFF, ACTA, supra note 297 
(explaining how the European Parliament overwhelmingly opposed ACTA and 
how the American public can oppose it as well). 
301  EFF, ACTA, supra note 297 (explaining how India and Brazil have rejected 
ACTA from its onset and criticized its efforts to bypass existing international 
fora). 
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penalties would also apply for “significant willful” infringement 
even if there were no “direct or indirect motivation of financial 
gain,” without any of the traditional copyright limitations, such as 
fair use.302   
At least six of the member nations had to ratify the ACTA in 
order to give it effect.  Currently, only Japan has ratified the 
treaty,303 although there were indications as of 2013 that Canada 
was moving towards ratification.304  Many have argued that the 
crushing rejection of the ACTA by the EU makes international 
implementation unlikely,305 although the United States has vowed 
to continue fighting for more ratifications.306 
 
4.1.3. Reinventing SOPA/PIPA?  The “New” TPP 
 
Like the ACTA, the TPP is being negotiated in highly secretive 
regional negotiations,307 but WikiLeaks released proposed drafts of 
                                                     
302  Id.; see also Art Brodsky, Public Knowledge Statement on Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://publicknowledge.org/issues/acta (pointing out the flaws in the way the 
ACTA agreement was reached). 
303  Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) by Japan, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF JAPAN (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/acta_conclusion_1210.html; see 
also EFF, ACTA, supra note 297 (listing the states that negotiated, signed, and 
subsequently ratified the ACTA). 
304  Maira Sutton, Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), US Trade Office 
Calls ACTA Back from the Dead and Canada Complies, EFF.ORG (Mar. 1, 2013) 
[hereinafter EFF, US Trade Office], https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/us-
trade-office-calls-acta-back-dead-and-canada-complies (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
305  See, e.g., David Meyer, ACTA Rejected by Europe, Leaving Copyright Treaty 
Near Dead, ZDNET (July 4, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/acta-rejected-
by-europe-leaving-copyright-treaty-near-dead-7000000255 (arguing that since the 
European Union “flatly reject[ed]” the ACTA, and six of the eight non-EU signing 
countries must ratify the ACTA for it to come into force, survival of the treaty 
depends on U.S. ratification). 
306  See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2013 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT (2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/reports-and-publications/2013/2013-tpa-2012-ar (reporting that 
discussions on ACTA were priority agenda items sponsored by the United States 
in TRIPS Council meetings in 2012); see also EFF, US Trade Office, supra note 304, at 
1 (observing that the United States is working with Japan “to ensure that ACTA 
can come into force as soon as possible” and that Canada introduced a bill on 
intellectual property ensuring compliance with the ACTA, responding to U.S. 
pressure). 
307  Current parties to negotiations include the United States, Australia, 
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the TPP Intellectual Property Rights Chapter.308   
The first leaked draft of the TPP indicated that negotiators, 
particularly the U.S. negotiators, were pushing for the adoption of 
IP minimum standards far more restrictive than those currently 
required by TRIPS and more extreme standards than those in the 
controversial ACTA.309  The second proposed draft text of the TTP 
was leaked in October 2014.  This draft similarly reflects robust 
proposals to heighten liability and enhance copyright protection 
beyond any existing multilateral copyright instrument.  Digital 
rights management, ISP liability and copyright term lengths 
remain disputed issues among negotiating parties.310  Similar to the 
TRIPS Agreement, the draft reveals differences of approach to the 
breadth and nature of copyright enforcement.311  
                                                     
Canada, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Chile, Peru, and 
New Zealand.  See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, EFF.ORG, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (naming nations 
negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement); see also Lydia DePillis, 
Everything You Need to Know About the Trans Pacific Partnership, WASH. POST 
WONKBLOG (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/11/everythin
g-you-need-to-know-about-the-trans-pacific-partnership (discussing the 
membership of the Trans Pacific Partnership, China’s absence, and how this 
regional trade agreement is a response to the WTO being too cumbersome for 
“’high-standard’” trade deals). 
308  See Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)—IP Chapter, 
WIKILEAKS.ORG (Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter WIKILEAKS],  http://wikileaks.org/tpp 
(displaying the leaked draft’s contents). 
309  See generally Sean Flynn, Margot E. Kaminski, Brook K. Baker & Jimmy H. 
Koo, Public Interest Analysis of the US TPP Proposal for an IP Chapter (Am. Univ. 
Wash. College of Law PIJIP Research Paper Series, Paper No. 21, 2011), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&con
text=research (providing a preliminary analysis of the initial leaked drafts of the 
TTP).  See also Carolina Rossini & Yana Welinder, All Nations Lose with TPP’s 
Expansion of Copyright Terms, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/all-nations-lose-tpps-expansion-
copyright-terms (arguing that all nations will be harmed by having to adopt 
extended copyright terms that give excessive protection to large U.S. record and 
movie production companies that lobbied for such changes in the U.S.). 
310  See Updated Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) — IP Chapter 
(second publication), WIKILEAKS.ORG (Oct. 16, 2014), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/ 
[hereinafter WIKILEAKS 2]. 
311  Jeremy Malcom & Maira Sutton, Latest TPP Leak Shows US Still Pushing 
Terrible DRM and Copyright Term Proposals—and New Threats Arise, EFF.ORG (Oct. 
16, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/latest-tpp-leak-shows-us-
still-pushing-terrible-drm-and-copyright-term-proposals.  In particular, the 
United States is pushing for a broader enforcement of criminal liability, which 
would extend to acts of non-commercial infringement.  Id.  Canada disagrees, 
arguing that criminal remedies should only apply to commercial conduct.  In 
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Commentators vigorously criticize the TPP’s IP Chapter for its 
inconsistency with existing laws in every TPP member country, 
including the U.S. itself.  In particular, the obvious retreat from 
policy flexibilities available in TRIPS that allow countries to 
experiment with social welfare policies, including addressing the 
supply of public goods, has been very controversial.312  The future 
of the TPP is still unclear and the shape of its IP Chapter is even 
more so. But ongoing national copyright reform efforts in many 
key countries suggest that there is plenty of room to anticipate 
conflicts over the extent to which multi-stakeholder national 
reforms can be dialed back to accommodate multilateral rules that 
might emerge. To the extent the two tracks produce conflict, it will 
only create more room to engage in the kind of legal innovation we 
have witnessed in the twenty-one years of the TRIPS Agreement.  
At its most fundamental, legal innovation is a testament to the 
irreducibility of the “local” and the “domestic” despite a world 
permeated with multilateral disciplines. The IP reform efforts in 
Brazil and South Africa, briefly discussed below, are good 
examples of the resilience of the domestic welfare impulse where 
IP policy is concerned. These reform efforts are, in themselves, 
forms of legal innovation directed at defining the relationship 
between TRIPS and any future multilateral engagement in IP 
norm-setting processes.   
 
4.2. Brazil’s IP Reform 
 
Brazil recently launched a patent reform process and issued a 
patent reform report in 2013. 313   The report outlines paths to 
stimulate innovation in Brazil and to strengthen national 
industries. 314   Although the report is generally an outline 
                                                     
addition, the draft contains a new rule against formalities.  Id.  This language 
appears to be agreed upon by the negotiating parties and could present 
difficulties should any of the negotiating parties seek to re-introduce formalities 
into copyright protections that reach beyond minimum international standards.  
See Krista Cox, New WikiLeaks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Intellectual 
Property Chapter—Analysis of Copyright Provisions, ARL POL’Y NOTES (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://policynotes.arl.org/post /100163582662/new-wikileaks-of-the-trans-
pacific-partnership. 
312  Flynn et. al, supra note 309, at 2–4. 
313  CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, supra note 256.  
314  Id. at 10 (discussing the use of seminars and debates involving a wide 
range of representatives to produce innovative new ideas to develop the scope of 
Brazilian patent legislation). 
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recommending patent policy moving forward, it has produced 
some results.   
The first is a patent reform bill.315  This bill limits patent terms 
to a strict maximum of twenty years, in contrast to the current 
Patent Act, which authorizes some extensions beyond twenty 
years.316  It clarifies that new-use patents and new forms of known 
substances are not considered inventions.317  It also heightens the 
inventive step standard, creates a pre-grant opposition system, 
updates ANIVSA’s Prior Consent mechanism, clarifies the 
protection of undisclosed pharmaceutical test data and implements 
the public non-commercial use mechanism as set forth by TRIPS.318  
Additionally, the report resulted in a Presidential Decree creating 
the Council of Intellectual Property Rights. 319   The report 
emphasizes the importance of economic, social and technological 
advancement in developing countries.320   
To improve on the patent system, the report makes a series of 
recommendations.  It recommends heightened non-obviousness 
standards so that frivolous patents are not granted and incremental 
innovations are widely developed.321  Additionally, it advocates 
that new-use and polymorph patents should not be granted, as 
they do not meet the patentability requirements of novelty and 
non-obviousness.322  The report also calls for an avenue for pre-
grant opposition, allowing for an increase in the quality of 
patents. 323   Although the current Brazilian patent law already 
allows for compulsory licenses, the report calls for a more 
elaborate public non-commercial-use mechanism. 324   Finally, a 
warning is offered against examining software patent applications 
without an “extensive public consultation . . . regarding the risks 
                                                     
315  H.R. 5402/2013 (May 2013).  
316  CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, supra note 256, at 13–14. 
317  Id. at 14. 
318  Id. 
319  Id. 
320  Id. at 39.  The original Patent Act, passed in 1997, intended to reach these 
same goals.  But, the report argues that none of this took place after the original 
Patent Act was passed.  Furthermore, the strengthened IP rights following the 
original Patent Act had a negative impact on access to health products and 
processes. 
321  Id. at 65. 
322  Id. at 127. 
323  Id. at 70–78. 
324  Id. at 90–99. 
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and eventual benefits that the practice can offer to Brazil[.]”325 
The Brazilian process is highly unstable, politically 
controversial, and its future is uncertain.  Nonetheless, it has 
produced important signals about Brazil’s orientation toward the 
role of patent law in its economic development.  As an unfolding 
process, nothing in the draft bill can technically be a basis for a 
TRIPS complaint.  However, the principles, concerns and proposals 
in the draft bill have an important normative influence on Brazil’s 
existing patent law and institutions.  Not only do the draft 
provisions reflect an intention to maximize TRIPS flexibilities, they 
also point forward to the development of doctrine in areas that 
TRIPS did not fully occupy.  In short, the reform process has been 
an experiment station in which new ideas, while not fully formed, 
nonetheless suggest an expanding capacity and agility to leverage 
patent law in the design of Brazil’s future economy. 
Brazil is also engaged in an intensely watched and contested 
copyright reform process.  In late November 2011, the third version 
of Brazil’s copyright reform draft bill was leaked.326  The leaked bill 
contains many new and modified provisions, including the 
addition of works for hire with employer control limited to ten 
years, the exhaustion of copyrights after the first authorized sale in 
a WTO member country, the authors’ ability to put their works 
into the public domain during their lifetime and expanded 
compulsory licenses.327  Exceptions to copyright infringement are 
expanded328 to include space-shifting, reproductions for persons 
with more than just visual disabilities, reproductions of lectures, 
addresses, and lessons by the intended audience, reproductions for 
conservation and preservation purposes, and musical 
performances in religious temples—while, at the same time, 
further restricting public performance exceptions. 329 
                                                     
325  Id. at 205. 
326  See Pedro Paranaguá, Inside Views: Brazil’s Leaked Copyright Reform Draft 
Bill Shows Latest Thinking, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 12, 2011, 7:26 PM) 
[hereinafter Paranaguá, Leaked Draft], http://www.ip-
watch.org/2011/12/12/brazils-leaked-copyright-reform-draft-bill-shows-latest-
thinking (last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (describing the leaked content of the Brazilian 
copyright reform). 
327  Id. 
328  See Pedro Mizukami, Brazilian Copyright Reform Draft Bills Comparative 
Tables, INFOJUSTICE.ORG, http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Brazilian-Copyright-Reform-Comparative-Table.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (displaying a table of the proposed changes to copyright 
law in the leaked Brazilian reform). 
329  Another controversial bill at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is the 
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Like the patent reform process, the final landing strip for the 
Brazilian copyright reform is not yet clear.  Nonetheless, some of 
the bold initiatives and massive efforts to engage the Brazilian 
polity already reveal a deep understanding of the cultural impact 
of copyright policy in society. The reform process has already 
committed itself to rhetoric about access to knowledge that, even if 
not borne out in formal law, will undoubtedly shape the 
conceptual framework of the knowledge economy and the 
expectations of the Brazilian society for some time to come. 
 
4.3. South Africa’s Draft IP Policy 
 
In 2013, the Republic of South Africa’s Department of Trade 
and Industry issued a Draft Policy for its framework on intellectual 
property.330   Because South Africa does not have a national IP 
policy, the DTI sought to ensure coherence through the new policy 
framework.331  The document provides a basic outline of the policy 
objectives and provides background on issues that IP policy should 
address, such as public health, agriculture, genetic resources, 
indigenous knowledge, the Internet, software issues and various 
                                                     
Marco Civil bill.  See Pedro Mizukami, Copyright Week: What Happened to the 
Brazilian Copyright Reform, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://infojustice.org/archives/31993 (last visited Oct 8, 2014) (discussing the 
recent history of copyright law reform in Brazil and controversy over the Marco 
Civil bill for “eschewing a notice-and-takedown system”).  The initial version of 
the bill, which was the result of a public-consultation process, promoted free 
speech and open access by requiring a court order for all content removals.  Id.  
Under this proposed system, “content would be removed from the Internet only 
in response to a court order, eschewing a notice-and-takedown system,” which 
can be found in other countries such as the U.S.  Id.  This court-order system 
empowered creators and sharers of online information and improved the power 
imbalance between users, service providers, and the entertainment industry.  Id.  
Unfortunately, concessions were made to industry lobbyists, and the current 
version of Marco Civil creates an exception: the Marco Civil court-order system is 
not applicable to copyright infringement.  Id.  This means that content removal 
involving copyright infringement will be subject to Brazil’s copyright reform bill, 
rather than Marco Civil.  As of its third draft, the copyright reform bill has a 
notice and takedown structure similar to that adopted by the U.S.  See Paranaguá, 
Leaked Draft, supra note 329 (discussing the leaked draft’s new ISP liability, 
including the new notice-and-takedown structure). 
330  DEP’T. OF TRADE & INDUS., DRAFT NATIONAL POLICY ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (IP) OF SOUTH AFRICA: A POLICY FRAMEWORK (2013), available at 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SA-IP-Policy-
Sept-2013-36816_gen918.pdf. 
331  Id. at 5. 
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copyright and patent reforms.332 
The framework importantly addresses “Patent[s] and Access to 
Public Health.” 333   This section emphasizes that because South 
Africa is using a depository system, which grants weak patents, it 
limits access to public health.334  South Africa, like India, pushes for 
pre- and post-opposition of patents to “foster the spirit of granting 
stronger patents.” 335   Referencing the flexibilities allowed to 
developing countries by the Doha Declaration, the framework 
recommends amending the Patents Act to be “amenable to issues 
related to access to public health.”336  To further promote public 
health, it recommends introducing compulsory licensing that 
adheres to international treaties.337 
In the section on agricultural and genetic resources, the 
framework recommends that developing countries should not 
provide patent protection for plants and animals, with an 
exception for certain types of biotechnology-related patents.338  In 
particular, the framework recommends an amendment to South 
Africa’s PVP (plant-variety-protection) system to allow farmers to 
“reuse, resell and exchange seeds.”339  
Regarding the advancement of developing countries, the 
framework encourages the expanded use of the flexibilities 
afforded by the TRIPS Agreement and firmly rejects any trade 
agreements that are TRIPS-plus in nature.340  The framework is 
particularly blunt in cautioning against advice or agreements 
involving developed nations:  “South Africa . . . must cautiously 
filter advice coming from these developed nations and their 
institutions as they may undermine the multilateral arrangements 
or may not be sensitive to IP and development.”341 
Pharmaceutical companies in particular have reacted 
negatively to the new proposals.  The Innovative Pharmaceutical 
Association of South Africa hired a lobbying firm to oppose the 
draft policy and to persuade the South African government to 
                                                     
332  Id. at 3. 
333  Id. at 8. 
334  Id. at 8–9. 
335  Id. at 10. 
336  Id. at 9. 
337  Id. at 21. 
338  Id. at 22. 
339  Id. 
340  Id. at 34. 
341  Id. at 35. 
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strengthen patent protection, rather than weaken it. 342   On the 
other hand, health activist groups, including the Treatment Action 
Campaign and Médecins Sans Frontières, strongly support South 
Africa’s draft IP framework and have condemned the 
pharmaceutical lobbying attempt.343 
Similar to the Brazilian reform process, South Africa’s Draft 
Policy creatively establishes the contours of the domestic IP debate 
in a way that delimits the role of the multilateral system without 
violating the TRIPS Agreement.  The Draft Policy is neither 
explicitly legal nor political.  Instead, it employs a cultural 
framework in which the sole organizing thrust is the question of 
how IP law can advance South African interests in the areas that 
are relevant to the country’s stylized vision of the future, while at 
the same time identifying ways that will not lead to that land of 
promise.   
Indeed, it is interesting to note how concerns about TRIPS 
obligations or violations are not a major theme of the report, nor is 
the theme anti-TRIPS as such.  Rather, in a manner presaging legal 
innovation, the Draft Policy proceeds in terms that may best be 
described as “in spite of TRIPS.”  The future of the Draft Policy or 
any prospects of hard law emerging from its pages are highly 
uncertain.  However, that may not be the purpose of the Draft 
Policy.  Instead, the Policy is best understood as a first step in 
concretizing and formalizing a vision of welfare that the country 
can own.  This distinctive mark of ownership over IP policy is, by 
itself, a material step in the advancement of the benefits classically 
linked to a socially accountable knowledge economy. 
 
4.4. TRIPS, Legal Innovation and the Age of Uncertainty 
 
The parallel efforts of plurilateralism, with its stronger and less 
flexible IP provisions, and national reform efforts, with bold 
experimentation of maximalist interpretations of TRIPS 
flexibilities, clearly illustrate that the national context has once 
                                                     
342  See Linda Daniels, Concerns Erupt over Leaked Pharma Lobbying Plan Against 
IP Policy in South Africa, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:14 PM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/01/22/concerns-erupt-over-leaked-pharma-
lobbying-plan-against-ip-policy-in-south-africa (explaining how the South African 
Trade and Industry Minister named a pharmaceutical company’s lobbying 
attempt against the implementation of a new intellectual property policy for the 
country “a plan for genocide”). 
343  Id. 
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again become the reference point for international IP relations.  
Despite ongoing plurilateral talks, countries will continue to 
delineate their own appropriate national borders in the shadows of 
the TRIPS Agreement.  National reform movements will likely 
continue to grow and spread to other countries. 344   While 
plurilateral efforts reflect a top-down approach to harmonization, 
national IP policies and reform initiatives often reflect just the 
opposite. History is clear that the latter approach, in which 
national laws evolve and eventually converge, is the more 
sustainable of the two. This is perhaps even more important in 
light of the necessary link IP law must have to economic growth 
and development in all countries.345  
The TRIPS Agreement represents an effort to change the role of 
the state in relation to markets and in relation to its obligations to 
its citizens; 346  a myriad of dynamic forms of legal innovation 
suggests that while the former is plausible, the latter is untenable.  
This heralds an uncertain future for the TRIPS Agreement.  The 
implausibility of a stable future for TRIPS as originally imagined is 
further accentuated by the complex web of actors who interact to 
influence, negotiate and control international IP standards.  
As noted in Part 1, the TRIPS Agreement attempted to create a 
system of equality and non-discrimination among member states 
through two principles:  NT and MFN.  Although these provisions 
may establish formal equality, in reality, the TRIPS Agreement falls 
short of creating a system of substantive equality between 
                                                     
344  For example, India recently announced that it will be developing a 
comprehensive national IP policy over the next six months.  See Govt Signals IPR 
Recast Ahead of Modi’s US Visit, INDIAN EXPRESS BUS. (Sept. 9, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/govt-signals-ipr-recast-
ahead-of-modis-us-visit; see also Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s IP Policy on Stage as 
Modi Heads to US, IP-WATCH (May 9, 2014), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2014/09/05/indias-ip-policy-on-stage-as-new-leader-heads-to-us 
(discussing the possibility of significant changes to India’s IP rights regime).  The 
first draft of India’s IP policy was opened for public comment in January 2015.  See 
Peter Leung, India Releases First Draft of National IP Rights Policy, MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP. (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/3414568/India-releases-first-draft-of-
National-IP-Rights-Policy.html. 
345  For an in-depth discussion of the tenuous relationship between strong 
IPRs, FDI, and economic growth in developing countries, see generally KEITH E. 
MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 78 (2000) 
(examining the multifaceted, economic impact of expanded intellectual property 
rights due to the emergence of global policy making) and Reichman, Twenty-First, 
supra note 78 (analyzing the reactive role being played by developing countries in 
the formation of global policy on intellectual property rights). 
346  Shaffer, supra note 79. 
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developed and developing countries. 347   This one-size-fits-all 
model fails to account for critical distinctions between member 
countries, including political and democratic limitations.  Similarly, 
in the developing and least-developed countries, TRIPS and the 
new multilateral processes fail to distinguish between the political 
and cultural costs of economic and technological barriers to 
development.  The trade principles of formal equality serve to 
exacerbate substantive inequities between developed and 
developing member states, particularly by impeding nuanced 
trade, development and investment efforts that differentiate 
between states by development status.348 
To reach a measure of substantive equality between the 
developed and developing world, effective economic and 
technological development efforts require some differential 
treatment among states, or as some critics argue, “positive 
discrimination.”349  This will necessitate a reassessment of current 
principles of formal non-discrimination and an acknowledgement 
that legal innovation will respond to any effort to enforce a 
harmonized national IP environment without regard to national 
welfare interests.  Scholars recognize that textual recognition of 
positive discrimination is an uphill battle.  Nonetheless, some 
suggest that the development of exceptions or flexible 
interpretations of non-discrimination by legislative and judicial 
actors at the domestic and international levels remains possible.350  
                                                     
347  See, e.g., Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in 
International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 114–18 (2008) (“[A] 
relatively small percentage of the complaints filed with the WTO have been filed 
by developing countries, and developed countries like the United States have 
refused to implement WTO rulings adverse to their domestic interests.  These 
facts suggest that, ‘after a decade of operation the WTO remains a rich man’s club 
beyond the reach of most developing nations.’”); Margaret Chon, Intellectual 
Property and Theories of Developmental Justice, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS 
PLUS ERA 256, 259, 279 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2014) (advocating for 
“substantive equality” over “formal equality,” departing from a strict application 
of the principle of non-discrimination by taking into account not only whether a 
country is rich or poor, but also each country’s development status with respect to 
international intellectual property law and development-sensitive human needs). 
348  Barbosa et al., supra note 347, at 114–15. 
349  Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: 
Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 257–58 (2007). 
350  See, e.g., Barbosa et al., supra note 347, at 117 (supporting an approach 
where both domestic and international “lawmaker[s] would exercise more 
skepticism towards the validity of a regulation where it conflicts with a 
development-sensitive human need, as defined in part by the Millennium 
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 Legal innovation with regard to the TRIPS Agreement is not 
occurring in isolation.  Rather, it reflects part of a broader 
transformation in international economic relations – one in which 
the increased political and economic leverage of middle-income 
developing countries has made multilateral bargains much harder 
to obtain. However, the weaknesses of the TRIPS Agreement could 
be, ultimately, also its greatest triumph.  Developed countries may 
learn the lesson that bargaining towards the baseline of existing 
economic and institutional realities, whether in developing country 
markets or in their own domestic markets, is a short-term strategy 
at best.  For the developing countries, there are prospects that 
opportunities at the national level to dial back policy losses 
attributable to imbalanced capacity and lack of resources for 
international negotiations can, and likely will, emerge. This has 
clearly been the case with respect to the outcomes of the Uruguay 
Round.  
 For both sets of countries, the twenty-first year of the TRIPS 
Agreement is an opportunity to acknowledge and embrace various 
forms of resistance and innovation in international intellectual 
property relations.  Rather than unraveling the TRIPS Agreement, 
such innovation may, instead, serve to strengthen those TRIPS 
norms around which all countries can respond to the compliance 
and welfare costs of the forced convergence of global IP norms.  At 
a minimum, twenty-one years of TRIPS should have taught the 
global community that national welfare considerations will 
inevitably resist, and legal innovation will invariably emerge, to 
counter the imprudence of a treaty that attempts to subvert the 
very territorial and self-seeking national ends for which IP law 
exists. It is in this complicated context of power, law and economic 
                                                     
Development Goals”); Broude, supra note 349, at 258 (“[A]ny formalization of 
differentiation smacks of discrimination that might unsettle MFN [(Most Favored 
Nation)] as a fundamental principle of the WTO's trade functionality, regardless 
of its pervasive erosion through regionalization.  The GATT/WTO system 
therefore may be more comfortable with an informal and inevitably non-
transparent system of de facto differentiation.”); Chon, supra note 347 (noting some 
potential ways of informal and de facto differentiation for nations and lawmakers). 
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351  J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation 
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